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Abstract 
Although taxation matters are generally accepted to be an issue of national concern, 
increasing attention is paid to international efforts at conforming and standardising taxation 
systems internationally. In a global economy where national borders are becoming less 
important for economic activity, this shift in focus is only appropriate. In order to deal with 
double taxation as a barrier to trade and investment, taxation treaties are negotiated between 
states to allow for predictable taxation for companies and individuals pursuing economic 
activity across national borders. The Model Tax Convention, published regularly by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is one of the most 
important documents for harmonising international taxation systems, and provide a basis for 
negotiations between states.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how and why the Model Tax Convention has become 
an important tool internationally, despite the limited membership of the OECD. It finds that 
through a strategy of portraying the Model Tax Convention as the obvious choice for policy-
makers, the OECD has legitimated the Model. However, this strategy has not had the desired 
effect on states, which do not necessarily adhere to the propositions encouraged by the 
OECD. Rather, states seem to make reservations towards the Model Tax Convention if they 
feel that its content does not satisfy their self-interests. This thesis furthermore finds that, 
depending on the countries negotiating, the outcome of negotiations over taxation treaties is 
determined by either the most powerful state or by moral considerations.    
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1 Introduction 
  Introduction 1.1
Double taxation arises when two or more states impose a tax on the same taxpayer for the 
same subject matter. The imposition of double taxation is commonly recognised to be a 
burden for economic actors attempting to pursue activities across national borders. When tax 
authorities in several states impose taxation on economic activity this can be a disincentive to 
invest, trade or otherwise carry out transactions across borders. This thesis will deal with 
efforts made towards dealing with double taxation, particularly the efforts of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In this introductory chapter I will give 
a brief historical account of the Model Tax Convention adopted by the OECD, before I 
outline the research questions of this thesis and show how and why these questions are of 
particular relevance. Lastly this chapter will explain how the research questions will be 
answered, and outline the structure of this thesis.    
 
 Historical Background 1.2
The mission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is to 
promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world (oecd.org, 2014). The OECD was officially created in 1961 after the OECD 
Convention between the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the 
United States and Canada was signed in 1960. Before 1961, the OEEC existed in Europe to 
run the Marshall Plan for reconstruction after World War II which was financed by the USA. 
Today the OECD has 34 member countries from all continents except Africa. The OECD 
today address problems in the international environment, discuss and analyse them, and 
promote policies aimed to solve the problems (oecd.org, 2014).  
 
Official efforts to deal with the issue of double taxation were first initiated in 1922 by the 
League of Nations, who conducted a study of the issue lead by its Committee of Technical 
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Experts (Kragen, 1964: 307). A few, mainly unilateral, efforts had been made by individual 
states before this to decrease double taxation, but this study represented the first concerted 
effort, and resulted in a draft of a model for double taxation treaties in 1928 (Kragen, 1964: 
307). The idea behind models for double taxation treaties is that these conventions represent a 
consensus among experts or states as to how bilateral taxation treaties should be constructed 
to decrease double taxation. They are primarily a tool for negotiators to use rather than having 
to negotiate the content of taxation treaties from scratch in each case where there is a need for 
taxation treaties between two or more states (Appendix 2, 2014 [interview]). The first draft 
written by the Committee of Technical Experts of the League of Nations was expanded and 
revised which led to two more Model Conventions being concluded in Mexico (1943) and 
London (1946) (OECD, 2012: 7). Neither of these Model Conventions were accepted 
unanimously, and the three models presented dissimilarities on the policies promoted in order 
to deal with double taxation.  
 
In 1956 the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC set out to study the fiscal questions relating to 
double taxation (Kragen, 1964: 307). In the 1950s the OEEC was the organisation which was 
available and had the interest in continuing the work with constructing a Model Convention 
for avoiding double taxation (Appendix 2, 2014 [interview]). The aim of this work was to 
establish a Model Convention which resolved the faults of earlier attempts to create Model 
Conventions. While the Fiscal Committee were conducting their study, the OEEC became the 
OECD, and in 1963 they delivered a final report of their work entitled “Draft Double 
Taxation Convention on Income and Capital” (OECD, 2012: 8). This was the first draft of a 
Model Convention published by the OECD, and the start of the organisation's work with 
finding effective solutions to solve double taxation. The idea was that this draft would be 
updated at a later stage when states had some experience in using the Draft Convention in 
negotiations, and the first revision came in 1971 as the “Model Convention and 
Commentaries” (OECD, 2012: 8). As economic conditions changed internationally, fiscal 
relations increased, new complex business organisations emerged at the international level 
and new technologies were developed, the OECD realised in 1991 that the revision of the 
Model Tax Convention had become an ongoing process (OECD, 2012: 8-9). The Model Tax 
Convention is therefore today an ambulatory Convention which is updated periodically and 
which has included states outside of the OECD in the process of updating the Convention. 
The latest update was completed in 2010, and the full version of the document was published 
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in 2012. This latest update and publication is used extensively in this thesis, and when I cite 
OECD, 2012 it is the updates from 2010 which is referred to.  
 
 Background for Research Questions 1.3
This thesis will attempt to answer two separate, but closely related research questions. The 
questions have been formulated after reading about the Model Tax Convention and 
developing a curiosity over how the Model Tax Convention has become an important tool 
internationally. This is particularly curious because the OECD is an organisation with 34 
member countries, but aiming to promote policies around the world. How an organisation has 
gained influence so far beyond the scope of its membership is interesting considering the 
development of international relations the last decades with ever-increasing interdependence 
between states with regards particularly, but not exclusively, to economic integration in the 
global economy.  
 
As globalisation is increasing the scope of the global economy the issue of how development 
is to occur is debated to great lengths within international relations. There is a vast difference 
between the economic situation in developed and developing countries. Economic integration 
has been put forwards as a solution to end poverty. For instance, the political scientist John 
Glenn has proposed debt relief for developing countries through the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative (2007: 206) to promote development. Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew 
Charlton has suggested that all states should allow for open market access to developing 
countries which are “poorer and smaller than themselves” (2005: 94). Trade agreements, 
subsidies and tariffs are other issues which have been negotiated over several years in the 
Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and which could have the ability to 
improve the economic situation for the poorest countries in the world if policies are made to 
their benefit. Simultaneously, developing countries are estimated to lose $1260 annually due 
to illegal tax avoidance (Kar and Curcio, 2011). Illegal tax avoidance through tax havens is 
often associated with criminals and corruption, but 60-65% of lost tax revenue results from 
commercial activity (Ken and Curio, 2011). Illegal tax avoidance is becoming an increasing 
concern on the international agenda, with the EU, the OECD, the G8 countries and civil 
society being the main drivers to find solutions. The increasing focus on taxation matters 
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should be considered not simply in light of illegal activities, but also in terms of the structural 
framework for delegating taxation rights. This is where the Model Tax Convention is of 
particular importance. Using the Model Tax Convention as a tool for negotiating taxation 
treaties between states is a step towards creating systems of taxation beyond the scope of the 
domestic economy in order to adapt to the globalisation of the political economy. 
 
The systems of taxation in existence today are governed by national authorities. Determining 
taxation rates and systems is considered an internal matter for individual states. At the same 
time some unity is required to deal with transnational transactions. Double taxation, as we 
have seen, is considered to be an obstacle for foreign direct investments (FDI) and trade. In 
order to promote economic activity across borders, the Model Tax Convention is constructed 
as a tool for negotiating taxation treaties between states. However, these two levels of 
governance should be kept in mind when considering the negotiations between states over 
bilateral taxation treaties. Negotiators cannot change national taxation systems, but have to 
form a consensus which is in line with systems and expectations.  
 
This thesis will deal with one area of taxation in particular, namely the taxation of royalties. 
Before the research questions are presented, I would like to outline where royalties derive 
from and why taxing royalties is an issue of particular importance.  
 
The Model Tax Convention defines royalties as follows: “The term “royalties” as used in this 
Article means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to 
use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, any 
patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information 
concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience” (OECD, 2012: 30). A royalty 
then, is a payment for the right to use property or knowledge that belongs to someone else. A 
good example is if an artist makes and records a song which is sold on iTunes. For every 
download, Apple as the owner of iTunes will have to pay a royalty to the artist. Through this 
mechanism, the artist can potentially earn money 50 years after the song was recorded even if 
no CDs are sold. However, the income the artist receives is not considered business income or 
income from employment, but income from royalty payments and is therefore taxed 
according to different taxation laws. In most states the taxation rates on royalties is roughly 
the same as corporate taxation rates. The Model Tax Convention has constructed policies for 
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where income from employment, business, dividends, shipping, capital gains and so on, 
should be taxable. For the most part, the Convention follows policies which make for a 
distribution of national income from taxation, where taxes are shared between the two states 
in question according to criteria of where income is generated. However, when it comes to the 
taxation of income from royalties, taxation rights are rewarded exclusively to the state of 
residence (usually high income countries). That means that source states (usually low income 
countries) should reduce their taxation rates on royalties with a source in their country to zero. 
In the case of the artist used above, this would mean that if the artist registered his song in one 
country, the royalties would be taxed here even if he recorded and released the song in 
another state. This principle of exclusivity is widely debated, and as we shall see in later 
chapters, contested by developing countries.    
 
In addition to taxation of royalties being of a different nature in the Model Tax Convention 
due to the exclusivity principle, the issue is of particular interest for other reasons related to 
international trends. First, the value of royalty payments have grown significantly over the 
last forty years due to an increasing reliance on outsourcing, the upsurge in the use of 
computers and software, and due to the increasing ease with which intangible property can be 
relocated anywhere in the world (Brooks, 2007: 178). These factors together means that 
royalties are worth more and are more frequently used. Secondly it has become easier to 
classify a payment as a royalty (Brooks, 2007: 178). In the case of the artist, the sale of CDs 
would have been classified as business income, but as more and more properties are 
digitalised, it becomes easier to classify payments as royalties. The same is true for the sale of 
books which has traditionally been characterised as business income, while eBooks fall under 
the category of income from royalties. In this case, the sale of an eBook would be taxed in the 
state of residence, even though the digitalisation of the book was most likely done in the 
source state. These trends makes the taxation of income from royalties more important, as the 
amount and value of royalties are increasing and royalties account for a larger share of capital 
to be taxed exclusively in the state of residence. It is not due to some strong sense of justice or 
developmental concerns that this thesis is focused on the issue of royalty taxation, but this 
background goes to show that the issue is controversial and of particular interest as it diverts 
from other propositions in the Model Tax Convention. As will be uncovered in greater detail 
in Chapter 4 and other empirical chapters, the principle of exclusive taxation rights to the state 
of residence has been received with scepticism by developing countries in particular.  
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It should be noted that where royalties are taxed is an issue which has large implications for 
the income for states. The potential income that states stand to gain or lose based upon the 
propositions of taxation treaties is enormous. Coupled with the international trends described 
above, it should be clear that the topic of royalty taxation is of considerable economic and 
political significance.  
 
 Research Questions  1.4
With this historical and empirical background the following research questions have been 
formulated:  
“How has the OECD proceeded in legitimating the Model Tax Convention? Why do 
countries from all over the world adhere to the OECD Model Tax Convention and its 
principle of exclusive right to tax royalties in states of residence?” 
 
The two questions are separate in the sense that they address different actors, but they are 
intrinsically linked by the fact that the answers will help shed light on the international 
standing of the Model Tax Convention, both how it is perceived and how it is used.  
 
Through answering the research questions I wish to contribute to several theoretical and 
empirical debates within political science. First, the question of adherence is becoming 
increasingly more important within studies of international politics. As will be outlined in 
further detail in Chapter 2, the question of what makes states comply with international norms 
and standards, is an ongoing debate. This thesis will contribute to the debate in the sense that 
it will explore reasons for adherence linked to an understanding of legitimacy and voluntary 
adherence. In other words, the thesis will not explore the reasons for adherence linked to the 
enforcement school or the management school, but will instead focus on variables of 
legitimacy, self-interests and power in negotiations, which will be further elaborated upon 
below.  
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Second, I wish to contribute to empirical debates around taxation in particular, and the role of 
institutions in general. This thesis will deepen the understanding of the Model Tax 
Convention and the OECD's work on taxation. By analysing the Model Tax Convention from 
both the perspective of the legitimation strategies of the OECD, as well as from a more 
practical perspective of state's level of adherence and reasons for adherence, this thesis will 
provide new empirical evidence on the influence and importance of the Model Tax 
Convention. Furthermore, the issue of taxation can be considered part of the ongoing debate 
on distributive politics. Institutions are considered tools for the distribution of resources, and 
in this sense the OECD contribute to the debate over how income from taxation should be 
divided among states.  
 
 Outline of Thesis 1.5
The research questions will be answered through three empirical chapters. Before I start the 
analysis, the next chapter will outline the theoretical background upon which this thesis is 
based. The overarching theories of liberal institutionalism, realism and constructivism will 
briefly be accounted for, as variables developed draws upon aspects of all these major theories 
of international relations. The majority of the theoretical discussion will be focused on the 
theories of legitimation and legitimacy as presented particularly by Marc C. Suchman, but 
mentions of Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane will also be used to account for the 
legitimacy debate, and theories of negotiation power and self-interests. Chapter 2 will also 
present the analytical model for how I intend to answer the research questions. Chapter 3 will 
build upon this model and outline the methods to be used. I will use the method of congruence 
in the analysis as well as an expert interview. The chapter will also assess the research design 
of the thesis in terms of Gerring's criteria for good research.  
  
The empirical analysis is divided into three chapters. Chapter 4 will focus on answering the 
research question of how the OECD has legitimated the Model Tax Convention. Using the 
legitimation strategies based upon the categories of legitimacy presented by Suchman I will 
use the publication of the Model Tax Convention to conduct a theory-guided analysis of the 
strategies used by the OECD. Chapters 5 and 6 will turn to answering the second research 
question of why states adhere to the Model Tax Convention. The focus on actors will shift 
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from the OECD to states in these chapters. Both chapters will first focus on determining to 
which extent states in fact do adhere to the Model Tax Convention and the principle of 
exclusive rights to tax royalties in the state of residence. Chapter 5 will consider the 
reservations that states have the opportunity to make and determine the reasons for adherence. 
Chapter 6 will look at a sample of bilateral taxation treaties in order to gain a better 
understanding of how the Model Tax Convention is used, and to see which factors determine 
the outcome of negotiations over the content of taxation treaties. Together the empirical 
chapters will answer the research questions and provide a thorough analysis of the Model Tax 
Convention, its perception among states and its practical application. Chapter 7 will consider 
the findings of this thesis as a whole and identify possibilities for further research.   
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2 Theoretical Background and 
Analytical Model  
 
  Introduction 2.1
Theory has been defined as “some simplifying device that allows you to decide which facts 
matter and which do not” (Baylis and Smith, 2005: 3). In order to study phenomena in 
international politics it is necessary to use such a device in order to sort out the facts that are 
of interest to one's study. The alternative would be to consider all the possible myriad of facts 
in existence which is simply impossible. The study of international relations can be 
understood as a continuous competition between the theoretical perspectives of realism, 
liberalism and constructivism, as well as the radical theories (Walt, 1998: 30). Each school of 
thought has overarching views on how the world works, as well as different branches of 
scholars who differ on the specific dynamics within the theoretical schools. Realism has been 
the dominant theory throughout the Cold War, and aims to study the facts of the world 
without notions of how these facts could or should change (Baylis and Smith, 2005: 4). Some 
scholars, such as Buzan, categorise the remaining theories of international relations into what 
he calls idealism and states that these theories attempt to study how the world ought to be, and 
to identify ways to avoid wars and conflict internationally (Buzan, 1996: 47, Baylis and 
Smith, 2005: 4). This distinction is however too broad in the sense that it does not capture the 
subtle differences between liberalism, constructivism and radical theories of Marxism. One 
should bear in mind the existence of several theoretical perspectives when studying 
international relations. This chapter will in section 2.5 outline the major theories of realism, 
liberal institutionalism and constructivism to serve as the overarching theories from which 
variables will be developed.  
 
This chapter will outline the theoretical framework for my research project, and indicate how 
I intend to use different theoretical contributions by introducing the analytical model. I will 
start by outlining the theoretical framework for legitimacy and legitimation strategies. The 
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theories outlined here will be used to identify variables of legitimation to answer the first 
research question of how the OECD has legitimated the Model Tax Convention. Section 2.4 
will briefly indicate the theoretical reasons for why adherence is an important and interesting 
topic to study in current international relations. Section 2.5 will address the theoretical 
perspectives used to derive explanations for adherence, where theories of legitimacy will be 
briefly returned to, as well as theories of self-interest and power in negotiations. After the 
theories have been outlined I will in section 2.6 develop the variables used to answer the 
second research question and construct the causal model. The purpose of this chapter is thus 
to present the theoretical background and framework that the rest of this thesis will build 
upon, and serve as a building bridge between theory and the empirical research and analysis 
in later chapters.  
 
 Legitimacy and Legitimation 2.2
This section will present the theoretical framework needed to answer the first research 
question of how the OECD has proceeded in legitimating the Model Tax Convention, as well 
as the theoretical background on legitimacy which is to be partly used to answer the second 
research question. This section will start by giving a general introduction to theories of 
legitimacy, before it turns to legitimation and develops variables to answer the first research 
question. The difference between legitimacy and legitimation should be made clear. 
Legitimacy refers to the audience's perception of an organisation and its policies. Legitimacy 
is thus the end-point that organisations seek to achieve. In answering the research question of 
why countries adhere to the Model Tax Convention of the OECD, the explanation may lie in 
the fact that they perceive the organisation as legitimate. In order to achieve legitimacy, 
organisations go through a process of legitimation. In answering the research question of how 
the OECD has gone about in legitimating the Model Tax Convention, it is the process of 
legitimation which is of interest. 
  
The theoretical landscape concerning institutional legitimacy is varied and spans from 
political science, sociology, and law, to organisational studies and business management. The 
extensive interest in the topic from authors from multiple academic fields reflects the 
importance of understanding the motivations behind institutions and organisations. Since the 
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late 1960s a change in how scholars view organisations has become apparent. Rather than 
focusing on the technological and material imperatives of organisations, cultural aspects, 
symbols and beliefs have come to define the dynamics of organisations (Suchman, 1995: 
571). This transformation of the organisational debate has its grounding in the concept of 
institutional legitimacy. Understanding how an organisation has come to enjoy the legitimacy 
of an audience can help shed light on the internal and external dynamics of the organisation. 
Arriving at an understanding of institutional legitimation is thus of interest to scholars from 
the above-mentioned academic fields and beyond.    
 
At the core of the discussion is the Weberian notion of legitimacy as a “conscious acceptance 
of certain behaviours and beliefs by social actors” (Drori and Honig, 2013: 347). Although 
this is a fairly vague definition of institutional legitimacy, it is in many ways the origin of the 
modern legitimacy debate, and is reflected in the literature. The definition identifies that 
social actors are the key audience for recognising an institution as legitimate, and the standard 
for determining legitimacy is a common understanding amongst this audience. The Weberian 
tradition also states that legitimacy provides the 'right to govern' (Courpasson, 2000). The 
right to govern is thus the end-point that institutions should attempt to reach, through a 
process of legitimation. While Bodansky (1999: 599) defines democracy as the most 
important basis for legitimacy in international politics, this thesis seeks to go further into the 
legitimacy debate and understand the processes that lie behind the legitimacy of an 
organisation.   
 
In order to do so, I have chosen to base this research project mainly upon the contribution 
from Marc C. Suchman who in 1995 published the paper “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic 
and Institutional Approaches”. In this paper he synthesises the existing literature on 
organisational legitimacy, and develops a broad definition of the concept. He also identifies a 
typology, where three main types of legitimacy are outlined. These are pragmatic legitimacy 
which refers to actor's self-interests, moral legitimacy which is a more normative approach, 
and cognitive legitimacy which refers to organisations gaining status to the point where it is 
taken for granted. In addition, he examines strategies for how an organisation can gain, 
maintain and repair their legitimacy with respect to each of these categories. This paper is 
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central within scholarly work on legitimacy and is often used by authors who apply theories 
of legitimacy and legitimation in their research.  
 
There is a variety of different types of scientific texts which use Suchman's seminal 1995 
paper as theoretical background (ISI Web of Science). Through looking up citations in Web 
of Science, I find that the piece has been cited more than 1500 times in academic texts. 
Suchman defines legitimacy as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995: 574). This definition is re-cited by several scholars 
when applying the concept of legitimacy in their work. As Suchman notes (1995: 572), many 
scholars employ the term legitimacy, but few define it properly. This observation has been 
accepted by several scholars, and many strive towards defining the term, often by using 
Suchman's definition (e.g. Hurd, 1999; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Tyler, 2006; 
Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Philips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) use Suchman's recognition 
that actors use strategies for gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy in their discourse 
analysis of the underlying processes of institutionalisation. Zimmerman and Zeitz refer to 
Suchman when they develop their theory on how new ventures gain legitimacy, by building 
on Suchman's strategies of conforming, selecting and manipulating environments in order to 
gain legitimacy (2002: 422). Tyler (2006) use Suchman's work in a psychological analysis of 
how authorities benefit from being viewed as legitimate by the people they are to lead, and 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) use the notion of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy 
when they analyse the role of rhetoric in legitimating institutional change. These papers show 
how Suchman's work has influenced scholars far beyond his own field of organisational 
studies and into the fields of psychology and administrative science. Political scientists have 
also used Suchman's work. Ian Hurd examines what makes states follow international norms, 
rules and commitments and expands on classical international relations explanations of 
coercion and self-interest, to include legitimacy as an explanation for state's behaviour in the 
international system (Hurd, 1999: 379-380). Other scholars such as Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999) and Scott and Lane (2000), refer to Suchman as one of the scholars who have 
examined legitimacy at the organisational level rather than at the level of classes (Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999: 65), and view organisations as objective viewers rather than groups of 
particular observers (Scott and Lane, 2000: 49). Cashore's contribution from 2002 analyses 
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non-state, market-driven governance systems in the case of sustainable forestry certification. 
Although his empirical focus differs from the focus of this paper, he develops his theoretical 
framework from Suchman's typology of legitimacy, and draws heavily upon his seminal 1995 
work (Cashore, 2002: 506), which is similar to the study in this thesis.  
  
As noted, Suchman (1995: 574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. This definition is 
inclusive and broad-based, but also explicitly acknowledges that social audiences are central 
in defining the dynamics of legitimacy, in accordance with the Weberian notion of legitimacy. 
It also recognises that legitimacy comes from some outside-entity which bestows the 
organisation with its perception of legitimacy. Suchman (1995) further distinguishes between 
three primary analytical categories of legitimacy which all fit within the definition above. 
These are pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. According to Suchman's typology, 
pragmatic legitimacy refers to the self-interested calculations of an organisation's most 
immediate audiences, moral legitimacy entails that the organisation is considered to inherent 
positive values and practices, and cognitive legitimacy is a less active, but even more robust 
form of legitimacy where the organisation is seen as the best and only viable option for its 
purposes. Strategies to promote all types of legitimacy can be employed by organisations. 
 
In Suchman's writings, it becomes evident that he believes that current researchers fail to 
define legitimacy coherently, and that this often leads them to neglect important parts of the 
concept of legitimacy. The need for identifying which aspects of legitimacy one is to consider 
is key according to Suchman (1995: 602), and through this chapter, I hope to give a clear 
picture of which aspects of legitimacy and legitimation this project is based upon, as well how 
these will be used in the empirical analysis.  
 
In their article “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions” from 2006, Buchanan and 
Keohane develop what they call a complex standard of legitimacy. For a thorough review of 
organisational legitimacy, they refer readers to Suchman's paper from 1995. The standard they 
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develop rests upon the assumption that institutions must have three institutional attributes in 
order to be deemed legitimate. These are minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit, 
and institutional integrity. Minimal moral acceptability entails that institutions must refrain 
from committing serious injustices, such as violating human rights (Buchanan and Keohane, 
2006: 419). Buchanan and Keohane thus has a less strict definition of the moral standards that 
an institution has to uphold than Suchman, who defines moral legitimacy as “the right thing to 
do”, but they also recognise that the standard for legitimacy should allow for, and even 
encourage institutions to work towards developing more demanding requirements for justice 
internationally (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 421). However, the concept of minimal moral 
acceptability still seems to correspond to Suchman's moral legitimacy. Both contributions 
claim that organisations and institutions must live up to a certain standard of morality in 
which they show their audience that the institution is committed to doing the right thing. Only 
then will the audience be able to accept the institution as legitimate. Comparative benefit 
refers to the ability of the institution to provide some benefit to its audience that would not 
otherwise be obtained (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 422). This means that the goals of the 
institution must be fulfilled, and that the audience that the institution is to address must 
consider the policies and the actions of the institution as beneficial. That an institution is 
deemed legitimate based upon the benefits that its audience considers it to have, again seems 
familiar with regards to Suchman's typology, and the concept is closely related to that of 
pragmatic legitimacy which is the benefits that an organisation bestows upon its audience. 
The last aspects of Buchanan and Keohane's complex standard of legitimacy is that of 
institutional integrity. An institution must show that they do not exhibit a pattern of disparity 
between its actual performance and its goals and claimed procedures (Buchanan and Keohane, 
2006: 422). This aspect of defining and categorising legitimacy differs from Suchman's 
typology, and Buchanan and Keohane do not include anything which shows similarities with 
cognitive legitimacy in their complex standard of legitimacy. Institutional integrity, as framed 
by Buchanan Keohane, will not be used further in this study. If the research question 
addressed the legitimation of the OECD as a whole rather than the Model Tax Convention, 
institutional integrity would have been a useful concept to apply, but as the research question 
is limited to the Model Tax Convention, institutional integrity falls outside the scope of my 
thesis.   
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Before moving on to addressing each ways of legitimating organisations and institutions, a 
note must be made of the difference in scope that each theoretical contribution outlined above 
refers to. While Suchman talks about the legitimacy of organisations, Buchanan and Keohane 
refer to that of global institutions. The scope of legitimacy is thus very different, as 
organisations in Suchman's theory are national, while Buchanan and Keohane address global 
governance institutions in a much more complex environment. The OECD in this thesis falls 
somewhere in-between these notions of organisations and institutions. OECD stands for The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, but has a broader agenda than 
Suchman's national organisations. However, not as broad as to be identified as a global 
governance institution, as membership is limited and is constrained to include only the most 
advanced economies in the world, as well as a few emerging economies. Suchman's work has 
been of such importance to the topic of legitimacy, also in the field of international studies 
that the theory is also relevant in analysing the OECD. I will now turn to the types of 
legitimacy mentioned above, and show how the OECD may employ these as strategies for 
legitimation. The reason for including Buchanan and Keohane in this discussion is to show 
how the framework presented by Suchman is supported by the writings of Buchanan and 
Keohane. Their theoretical frameworks differ slightly, but the essence of how the two 
contributions define and categorise legitimacy is complementary. In addition, Buchanan and 
Keohane have a more international scope which makes the theory relevant for this study. 
 
Pragmatic legitimacy refers to legitimacy based on the self-interested calculations of an 
organisation's most immediate audiences (Suchman, 1995: 578). This means that an audience 
will make this judgement based on their own calculations of what benefits they stand to gain 
or lose by accepting the organisation.  
 
The most basic form of pragmatic legitimacy is exchange legitimacy, which refers to an 
audience supporting an organisation in exchange for policies which are expected to be of 
value to the audience (Suchman, 1995: 578). That is, if the audience expects the sum of the 
policies of an organisation to be of value, they will perceive it as legitimate. Pragmatic 
legitimacy can also appear in the form of influence legitimacy, in which an audience deem the 
organisation legitimate because they believe that the organisation represents their larger 
interests (Suchman, 1995: 578). By incorporating audiences into the organisation's policy-
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making structures, or by adopting the policies and standards of an audience as its own, 
influence legitimacy can arise. Dispositional legitimacy can also be regarded as a form of 
pragmatic legitimacy. More dispositional characteristics from the audience, such as a belief 
that the organisation has “our best interests at heart” or “share our values”, can result in the 
organisation achieving legitimacy. This last form lies on the boundary between pragmatic 
legitimacy and moral legitimacy, but the key here is that the dispositional characteristics 
reflect that the audience holds the belief that these characteristics are beneficial primarily for 
their own interests.  
 
Pragmatic legitimacy thus has several aspects, but overall pragmatic legitimacy is based upon 
self-interested evaluations of the organisation as a whole by its audience. An organisation 
which has a desire to be evaluated as pragmatically legitimate will employ strategies of 
legitimation in which they emphasise the self-interests that states have in accepting the 
organisation. We would expect to see statements that focus on why states should accept this 
particular organisation over alternative actors that pay particular attention to the benefits that 
states will gain.  
 
Buchanan and Keohane's version of pragmatic legitimacy is what they call comparative 
benefit. In their view, institutions have primarily an instrumental justification for existing. 
The main reason why an audience accepts an institution and their activities is because they 
see the institution as a provider of some benefits that would not otherwise be obtained 
(Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 422). Buchanan and Keohane thus have a similar 
understanding of the first pillar of legitimacy as Suchman, which in this thesis will be referred 
to as pragmatic legitimacy.  
 
Moral legitimacy is based on positive normative evaluations of the organisation and its 
activities (Suchman, 1995: 579). Audiences base their judgement of the moral legitimacy of 
an organisation upon whether its activities are considered “the right thing to do” (Suchman, 
1995: 579), which is an evaluation of whether this activity is deemed as efficiently promoting 
social welfare. This is a normative evaluation as stated at the outset, but nonetheless an 
evaluation based upon the socially constructed value system of the audience. According to 
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Buchanan and Keohane (2006: 419), the minimum requirement of a value system is the basic 
human interest’s conception of human rights. The basic human interest’s conception is 
derived from the writings of Joseph Raz and states that rights are normative relations and 
provide a protection of interests (Raz, 1986:17). Because the notion of human rights is 
contested amongst scholars as to what the appropriate content of rights should be Buchanan 
and Keohane claims that only the least contested rights have to be upheld by an institution in 
order for it to be legitimate (2006: 420). They themselves admit that this is indeed a minimal 
standard, but I would go further and say that it's a weak standard of morality. Rather, I believe 
that an audience will have higher moral requirements towards an institution, and would not 
acknowledge the institution as legitimate unless some greater principles of morality were 
upheld than simply observing the least controversial human rights. Instead, I believe that 
Suchman has a more relevant view of morality, even though the definition of morality as “the 
right thing to do” is more abstract and subjective than Buchanan and Keohanes's definition. 
One reason for the differing standards may be the aforementioned differentiation in scope 
between Suchman and Buchanan and Keohane. Suchman has a more limited scope when he 
addresses organisations at the national level, while Buchanan and Keohane examine 
institutions at the global level, and global norms are weaker as wider spectres of actors have 
to agree. Regardless, moral legitimacy in this thesis will be defined through Suchman's 
definition, resting on whether the institution and the audience are concerned mainly with 
whether policies reflect the “right thing to do”. Because moral legitimacy is a normative 
evaluation, it will by its very nature depend on the subjectivity of the particular member of the 
audience in question. Moral legitimacy will for the purpose of this project be viewed as pro-
social, positive normative judgements from each member of the audience based upon their 
socially constructed value system. Moral legitimation strategies are conscious efforts from the 
organisation to appeal to its audience's morality and be accepted as morally legitimate.    
 
Consequential legitimacy is one sub-category of moral legitimacy in which the institution is 
judged by its accomplishments (Suchman, 1995: 580) and whether these are considered 
rightful by the audience. Another form of moral legitimacy can derive from procedural 
legitimacy, which refers to the organisation being perceived as using “sound practices” or 
generally applying techniques or procedures which are socially accepted. If outcomes are 
produced in a way which explicitly includes evaluations of moral factors in the production 
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process, then procedural legitimacy can be achieved. Such a procedural step can be to 
emphasise democratic or all-inclusive policy-making where actors are involved in influencing 
the policies that are produced. As this thesis will show, the OECD taking steps towards 
including non-members states in the process of producing and evaluating policies, can be one 
such procedural measure. Similarly, structural legitimacy can be achieved if the organisation 
is perceived as having “sound structures”. If the structural characteristics of an organisation 
can be identified as having morally favourable outcomes, as reflecting its capacity to perform, 
this may result in structural legitimacy. Lastly, moral legitimacy can be achieved through 
personal legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 581). Having a charismatic leader who is considered to 
add some moral standing to the organisation may also result in audiences considering the 
entire organisation as legitimate. In the case of taxation matters in the OECD, personal 
legitimation is not expected to be of any significant relevance.  
 
When measuring moral legitimacy and moral legitimation strategies in this thesis I will focus 
on whether states and the OECD are arguing in favour of the organisation by using moral, 
pro-social justifications. If states choose to emphasise normative arguments in favour of the 
OECD and the Model Tax Convention this may indicate that they adhere based upon these 
arguments. The OECD may also try to appeal to the morality of states in their legitimation of 
the Model Tax Convention.  
 
Cognitive legitimacy is a less active type of legitimacy, where the audience deem the 
organisation as necessary or inevitable (Suchman, 1995: 582). Cognitive legitimacy does not 
rest on conscious evaluations in the same manner as pragmatic or moral legitimacy, but rather 
depends on the audience taking an organisation as a given. This type of legitimacy is harder to 
achieve, but will also provide the most stable and resilient form of legitimacy if it is achieved 
(Suchman, 1995: 585). If an organisation's activities are taken for granted, in the sense that 
other alternatives are unthinkable, it has reached cognitive legitimacy. The organisation can 
also have activities which are so all-embracing that they are no longer subject to active 
scrutiny or a myriad of competing alternatives, also referred to as the comprehensibility of the 
organisation. These two forms of cognitive legitimacy are fairly close to each other, but the 
difference lies in the level of 'obviousness', where taken-for-grantedness is the most stable 
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version, and also encompasses the less solid comprehensibility characteristic which is 
achieved if the activity the organisation provides seems significantly less meaningful without 
the organisation.      
 
Cognitive legitimacy can in general be recognised by a lack of contemplation by the audience, 
as calculations and evaluations are absent if they perceive it comprehensible or if they take it 
for granted. Through a concealing of information and a lack justification of the organisation it 
is possible to find evidence of cognitive legitimation strategies from the organisation itself.  
 
The theoretical framework of legitimacy and legitimation strategies that has been presented 
here focuses mainly on Suchman's categories of legitimacy, with Buchanan and Keohane as 
supportive contributors to the theory. In order to answer the second research question a more 
comprehensible theoretical framework is necessary, but before I outline the remaining 
theories, the variables used to answer the first research question will be presented in the next 
section.    
 
 Variables of Legitimation  2.3
The previous section outlined the relevant theories needed to answer the first research 
question. In order to find out which strategies of legitimation the OECD has used to promote 
the Model Tax Convention, the following variables will be considered. 
 
Pragmatic legitimation is strategies based upon promoting the self-interests of states. In 
empirical analysis, pragmatic legitimation can be recognised by the OECD emphasising how 
the Model Tax Convention is beneficial to states. Alternatively, if the OECD makes an effort 
to show how their values are in line with their audience's values, this might be a sign of 
pragmatic legitimation which stresses dispositional attributes.  
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Moral legitimation strategies by the OECD will be recognised by attempts to communicate 
how the Model Tax Convention represent the “best thing to do” for countries in international 
taxation matters. Moral legitimation can be recognised in the empirical data by statements that 
emphasise the pro-social and more normative aspects of the Model Tax Convention, as well 
as efforts to be inclusive and fair. 
 
Cognitive legitimation strategies may be recognised by efforts by the OECD to indicate that 
the Model Tax Convention is, or should be, the obvious choice of a model for negotiating 
taxation treaties. Through efforts at concealing information or downsides to OECD and the 
Model Tax Convention cognitive legitimation efforts can be recognised.  
 
This chapter will now turn to the theoretical framework needed to answer the second research 
question of why states adhere to the Model Tax Convention.  
 
 Adherence 2.4
The dependent variable in the second research question which asks why states adhere to the 
Model Tax Convention is adherence. The word adherence has its origin from the Latin word 
“adhaerere”, where 'ad' means 'to', and 'haerere' means 'to stick' (Oxford University, 2005). In 
international politics the literal translation of 'to stick to' policies, organisations or agreements 
is not often used, but conjugations with the same meaning such as 'adherence', 'abide by', 
'comply with', 'respect' or 'follow' are more commonly used to communicate the same 
phenomena. As topics of international governance are rising on the agenda internationally, the 
issue of adherence to these governance-efforts has also become central. Within international 
environmental governance increasing amounts of literature on compliance with international 
environmental regimes are emerging (see e.g. Barrett and Stavins, 2003 and Hovi, Sprinz and 
Underdal, 2009). The literature on compliance within international environmental regimes is 
representable for the general international relations literature which is becoming increasingly 
occupied with the issue of adherence to international norms, rules and commitments. The 
most common question asked is why states adhere to the norms, rules and commitments that 
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are being imposed on them by some outside entity. 
 
One scholar who has addressed the question of why states comply is Ian Hurd, who has a 
more general focus on international relations than the scholars of environmental regimes, and 
opens his article from 1999 by asking “what motivates states to follow international norms, 
rules, and commitments?” (Hurd, 1999: 379). Although Hurd focuses on enforcement of 
these international norms, rules and commitments, this article represents one example of how 
compliance and adherence has become an important issue on the international agenda.  
 
With the theoretical background of adherence outlined, it is possible to explore how this 
thesis will use adherence as the dependent variable. The variable will measure to what extent 
states in fact adhere to the Model Tax Convention and will be treated as a scaled variable. 
High adherence implies that a state accepts the content of the OECD Model Tax Convention, 
while low adherence implies that a state is less accepting of the propositions of the OECD. In 
some cases non-adherence may be referred to, which means that a states does not accept a 
particular proposition of the Model Tax Convention. However, non-adherence to a 
proposition does not necessarily mean that a state disregards the Model Tax Convention as a 
whole, but rather that a state's adherence is lower on the scale. As this thesis will focus on the 
OECD principle of exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence on income from royalty 
payments, low adherence on the dependent variable may not be a sign of low adherence to the 
entire Model Tax Convention. However, the issue of royalty taxation has several 
commonalities with the remaining propositions of the Model Tax Convention. In general, the 
OECD favours taxation in the country of residence, and promotes tax exemptions in the 
source country which is also the case with royalty taxation. Royalty taxation is a particularly 
controversial issue-area and one that has been debated to great lengths due to OECD's 
principle of exclusivity to the state of residence. It is because of the special importance of the 
exclusivity principle that I have chosen to focus my analysis on royalty taxation, which may 
also allow for a limited generalisation to the remaining propositions of the Model Tax 
Convention. 
 
Adherence will be measured in different ways depending on the empirical data at hand. In 
Chapter 5 adherence will be measured by looking at whether or not a state has reserved itself 
22 
 
from the OECD propositions. Through the process that the OECD has initiated to evaluate 
and continue to develop the Model Tax Convention, it is possible to disagree with certain 
propositions of the Model Tax Convention, and show this through reservations. A reservation 
can be interpreted as an intention not to adhere to this proposition of the Model Tax 
Convention, while a lack of a reservation can be interpreted as an intention to adhere. The 
first level of measuring adherence is thus through these reservations.  
 
I will measure adherence also by looking at bilateral taxation treaties in Chapter 6. Analysing 
a strategic sample of taxation treaties which have been concluded between states allows a 
consideration of how states act upon the reservations they themselves have made, or that the 
other contracting party has made. The sample is chosen based upon the variables considered 
to be important for explaining variance. If reservations are respected, then adherence to the 
Model Tax Convention is lower as propositions are followed to a lesser degree.  
 
In order to explain adherence, independent variables will be identified based upon the theories 
of realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism. The next section will give an 
introduction to these general theories before it goes on to outline the more specific theories to 
be used to identify the independent variables. 
 
 Approaches to Explaining Adherence 2.5
Realism has thus far been described as a theory aimed towards seeing the world as it is, rather 
than how it should be. But realist theory has more to it than simply a desire to study the facts 
of the world. The realist tradition has a long lineage and early notions of realist theories can 
be dated back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau. These scholars described 
the anarchical nature of international politics and focused on the human nature outside the 
organised polis of the state. Anarchy in realism is defined as a lack of a central authority to 
control the actions of sovereign states (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 163).  
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The inter-war period experienced a new surge in realist thinking and during the Great Debate 
of the late 1930s and early 1940s scholars such as Carr, Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan 
took to the stage (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 162). During the Great Debate realism took a 
more academic form, and one of the central teachings was that leaders should focus on 
interests rather than ideology and that peace could be obtained through the strength of nations 
(Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 162). The outbreak of World War II ended the Great Debate, and 
realist scholars considered the war empiric evidence for the triumph of realism. After the 
Second World War more modern scholars became important within realist theoretical debates 
such as Waltz and Mearsheimer who can be described as neorealist, or more specifically 
structural realists (see Waltz 1979, Waltz 1991, Mearsheimer 2001). Neorealists claimed to be 
more scientific than its classical predecessors, and wanted to operationalise the foundations of 
realism by narrowing them down to the element of structure (Forde, 1995:142). The 
distribution of power in international politics was the most important explanatory factor for 
why states behave as they do according to structural realism. But structural realism has also 
been challenged, most notably for the parsimonious assumption of distribution of power as 
the single most important explanatory factor in international politics. Contemporary realists 
such as Walt and Schweller have been characterised as neoclassical realists by Gideon Rose 
(1998), and they attempt to build a bridge between classical and structural realists by 
incorporating factors such as the perception of state leaders, state-society relationships and the 
motivation of states into the theory of realism (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 170). What they try 
to do then is to “place [...] domestic politics as an intervening variable between the 
distribution of power and foreign policy behaviour” (Walt, 2002: 211).  
 
What this review of the history of realism shows us, is that one cannot speak of a single 
theory of realism on which there is consensus. Realism is fragmented and different 
approaches as to how one can measure realism exist in the literature. However, there are 
certain important similarities which are the core elements of realist theory. The most 
important aspect of realism is the assumption that interactions between states find place in an 
anarchical state of affairs. Anarchy is the lack of a central authority to control the actions of 
sovereign states (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 163). Furthermore, realists agree upon the three 
Ss of realism, namely statism, survival and self-help (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 172-176). 
Statism refers to the state being the main actor, and the only sovereign entity in international 
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politics. Because states are sovereign actors, they compete with each other for security, 
markets and influence – in short they compete for power. The ultimate goal of the sovereign 
state is that of its survival. Secretary of State under the US presidency of Nixon, Henry 
Kissinger put the issue of survival into words: “a nation's survival is its first and ultimate 
responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk” (Kissinger, 1977: 204). Because of 
the anarchical state of nature in the international system and the lack of a higher authority, 
security for states can be achieved only through self-help (Dunne and Schmidt, 2005: 175). 
Self-help is “necessarily the principle of action” according to structural realist Waltz (1979: 
111). Rousseau's parable of the stag hunt where one hunter will sacrifice the interests of the 
group in order to satisfy his own immediate interests is a traditional illustration of the 
phenomena of self-help (Skyrms, 2004: 1). The core element of self- help in realism provides 
the basis for self-interests as a key priority of states, which will be elaborated upon below. 
With regards to self-interests it should be noted that as opposed to liberalism, realism assumes 
that states are positional, which means that they are not only concerned with their absolute 
gains, but also their relative gains (Grieco, 1988: 487). Being concerned with relative gains 
means that states in collaboration with other states and actors will not simply accept outcomes 
which increase their gains in absolute terms, but they will be hesitant to accept solutions 
which increase their gains less than their opposing party in negotiations or other 
collaborations. States will seek to maximise their gains and benefits to balance their power 
and self-interests against their opposing party.  
 
Liberalism has been the theory which has contested realism the most in international relations. 
While constructivism has been on the rise since the early 1980s with its emphasis on ideas, 
knowledge, norms and rules (Barnett, 2005: 252), and radical theories with Marxist thought 
about the nature of the capitalist market are still relevant – maybe even increasing in 
importance (Hobden and Wyn Jones, 2005: 226), liberalism has been the challenger to 
realism in the academic field of international relations with the longest history. Liberalism can 
be traced back to the writings of John Locke in the late seventeenth century, but had its surge 
in the inter-war period when it was believed by many that war was an outdated way to settle 
disputes between states (Dunne, 2005: 188). Liberal thought argues that economic 
interdependence will increase cooperation and discourage war and conflict between states, 
because the use of force will threaten prosperity (Walt, 1998: 32). The two most important 
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aspects of liberalism are the belief that normative thinking is necessary in order to promote 
peace between states, and that the notion of international cooperation through institutions as a 
way to secure international stability (Dunne, 2005: 195). Liberalists thus believe that 
cooperation between states is both possible and desirable, and that institutions can help 
facilitate these interactions as they provide an arena with rules and norms for states to act 
within. Liberalists consider absolute gains to be sufficient motivation for states to cooperate, 
because unlike realists they do not consider relative losses to be existentially threatening 
(Grieco, 1988: 487). Institutions are thus seen to provide an arena where states can have 
stable expectations internationally and create mutually beneficial outcomes (Lipson, 1984: 1-
2 and 12). Furthermore, institutions can help overcome selfish behaviour from states (Walt, 
1998: 32), in the sense that individual short-term gains are foregone on behalf of long-term 
benefits achieved due to sustained cooperation.  
 
Liberalism thus contributes to the theoretical landscape of international relations by exploring 
the conditions for cooperation between states. Liberal institutionalism adds to this perspective 
by encouraging international institutions as an arena to facilitate cooperation and create 
mutually beneficial outcomes between states.  
 
Constructivism has its origins in the early 1980s and is thus a much newer addition to the 
theoretical landscape of international relations studies than realism and liberalism. The theory 
was born out of the dissatisfaction with realism and liberalism, because these more traditional 
theories of international relations failed to recognise the importance of ideational forces such 
as ideas, knowledge, norms and rules (Barnett, 2005: 252). Constructivists felt that other 
theoretical approaches focused too heavily upon states having fixed interests, and upon 
material forces (Barnett, 2005: 252). One of the most important challenges to realism and 
liberalism came from Ruggie in 1983 when he challenged Waltz's seminal Theory of 
International Politics on the concept of change being a force initiated from states. Ruggie 
argued that the focus that realists and liberalists put on states as being the driver for change 
and transformation in international politics was failing to take into account important factors 
such as the density of interactions between actors other than the state (Barnett, 2005: 254). 
Another influential scholar who gave rise to constructivism was Ashley who pointed to the 
non-state actors of the world and claimed that realism as a theory did not manage to 
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understand how states' interests are not fixed, but are rather shaped by the global-historical 
forces (Barnett, 2005: 254) (Ashley, 1984). Wendt (1987), Onuf (1989) and Katzenstein 
(1996) are other influential scholars who added to the substance of the constructivist 
theoretical landscape which developed into a more academic field by the end of the 1980s.  
 
Constructivism's largest input to international relations theory is the added focus on human 
consciousness and ideas as a structural factor. As a social theory, constructivism addresses the 
conceptualisation of the relationship between actors and structures (Barnett, 2005: 258). 
Ruggie (1998: 856) has described constructivism as being concerned with “human 
consciousness and its role in international life”. This consciousness is not given, but is shaped 
by ideas, knowledge, symbols, languages and rules. These ideas shape how people and states 
behave, and determine what is deemed legitimate in any given society. The ideas that society 
is built upon and which has been agreed upon through human interactions construct a reality 
which is presented to us, and which other theories of international relations have taken as a 
given. Constructivism thus shows us that the structures in international relations are not 
coincidental, but have come to be through human nurture. The claim that world politics is 
socially constructed opposes the materialism that realism and liberalism is built upon (Wendt, 
1995: 71). 
  
How states view the arrangements of international politics is therefore not accidental, but has 
required consideration of social facts. Realities and actions are not random, but “action is 
driven by an actor's calculation of how a particular strategy is likely to further her preferences 
(…) They determine their course of action depending on a sense of self and what is 
appropriate for the situation” (Barnett, 2005: 259).  
 
These three overarching theories of international politics form the basis for the more specific 
theories that this section now will turn to.  
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2.5.1 Legitimacy 
 
The theoretical framework for legitimacy was outlined in detail in section 2.2, and a 
discussion of the theory therefore not necessary here. The perspectives of moral and cognitive 
legitimacy will be used to analyse whether states adhere to the Model Tax Convention due to 
a perception of legitimacy, while the perspective of pragmatic legitimacy is considered to fall 
under the theoretical framework of self-interests as presented in the next section.  
 
2.5.2 Self-interest 
 
Both the theory of realism and liberalism assume that states are occupied with their own self-
interests. Pragmatic legitimacy is based upon the self-interested calculations of states. 
According to Walt (1998: 38) the main instruments of states are economic and military 
power. The economic aspect is of the highest interest for this thesis. Economic power can be 
measured through the economic capabilities of states. As states seek to increase their power, 
increasing economic capabilities is the main self-interest that states have. Thus, the self-
interest of states is to pursue the policy which will maximise their economic capabilities to the 
largest extent.  
 
Pragmatic legitimacy corresponds to the more realist notion of states pursuing their self-
interests. Suchman and Buchanan and Keohane do not explicitly assume that states are 
necessarily benefit-maximisers, but when conducting evaluations of the pragmatic legitimacy 
of institutions, states will consider the same rationale as the benefit-seeking realist theory 
assumes. The implication is that whether states are in fact mainly concerned with their own 
interests as realists assume or not, calculations of the pragmatic legitimacy of institutions will 
involve states acting in accordance with the realist assumption.  
 
 
 
28 
 
2.5.3 Power in Negotiations 
While outlining the element of statism in realism, it became clear that the power of states is 
important to the theory. The importance of the state as the key actor in international politics 
coupled with its main goal of survival, implicates that states need to accumulate power to 
perform its tasks. Power is a common explanatory factor in analysis of international relations 
particularly within realism, and will also serve as a potential explanation for the actions of 
states with regards to why states follow the Model Tax Convention. In this thesis I am mainly 
concerned with power as a relational concept. This means that the power of one state is of 
interest only when it is seen in relation to the power of another state.  
 
The issue of relational power is furthermore of interest to this study mainly with regards to the 
negotiation of bilateral taxation treaties. States meeting with the goal of arriving at a common 
agreement upon how taxation matters between the two states are to be treated is an arena 
where the power of each state may influence the outcome. Theories on power in negotiations 
will therefore be the focus of this section.  
 
Traditional bargaining models in negotiation theories have been based upon game-theoretic 
models where the actors are assumed to be rational in the sense that they will accept outcomes 
of negotiation which leave them better off than they were before negotiations took place 
(Hopmann, 1996: 72). In addition actors are assumed to have more or less the same interests 
and symmetrical power capabilities, they are assumed to be unitary actors and negotiations 
are assumed to take place in a vacuum rather than within a system of complexity and 
interdependence (Hopmann, 1996: 96). However, as bargaining models have been further 
developed, assumptions have been relaxed and the issue of power distribution has become 
more central in theoretical as well as in analytical terms. Scholars such as Hopmann (1996), 
Zartman and Rubin (2000), Habeeb (1988) and Dupont (1994) have contemplated the effect 
of power on negotiation dynamics and outcomes. The concept of power has been extended 
beyond the traditional realist perspective of military power and put into the context of 
negotiations, where not only material capabilities are essential, but also the power of 
influence through negotiation tactics such as the use of threats or promises.        
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Hopmann (1996) is one of the main scholars who has described and developed a traditional 
bargaining model for international negotiations with game-theoretic arguments as the 
foundation. Such bargaining models assume the rationality of actors, and approximately 
symmetrical interests and powers (Hopmann, 1996: 96). However, in reality, the utilities of 
each party, and their power capabilities, are unlikely to be symmetrical. As Hopmann 
develops the bargaining model for negotiations, he relaxes the assumptions about symmetry 
and power, and refer to power as the resources that each party to a negotiation hold as well as 
their ability to exert influence on the opposing party in the negotiations (Hopmann, 1996: 
101). The conclusion which is reached from the discussion of this relaxation is that 
differences in power capabilities between the negotiating parties are important mainly because 
it translates into a difference in the ability to exert influence on one another in the negotiation 
setting (Hopmann, 1996: 109). The most important aspect of power relations in negotiations 
is therefore the balance of power between the parties, as one party may have an advantage 
over the other party in the case where it holds a greater power to influence this other party. 
This perspective is important for my study of taxation treaties because these treaties are 
negotiated between parties with differentiated power capabilities along the relevant 
dimensions which may influence the outcome of negotiations with regards to preferences 
about the content and to which extent states should adhere to the Model Tax Convention.   
 
Habeeb also recognises that analysis of negotiations have failed to put sufficient emphasis on 
power, and recommends that this issue should be discussed further to analyse and explain the 
outcome of negotiations (1988: 10). He develops a framework for power in negotiations 
which is recognised by viewing power as a process rather than some static concept, a result of 
having certain resources, and as something which creates outcomes (1988: 14). Power in 
Habeeb's model is a mixture of structural power which refers to the resources of the parties 
involved in negotiations, and behavioural power which is the ability to use these resources to 
achieve outcomes (1988: 16 & 23). Structural aggregate power is the sum of the demographic, 
economic and military resources of a state compared to the external world as a whole (1988: 
17), while issue-specific structural power are these resources in comparison with another 
actor in terms of a specific mutual issue (1988: 19). Behavioural power is reflected by the 
tactic an actor employs in negotiations, revealed through the communication with the 
opposing party to the negotiations (1988: 23). Through examining these capabilities and 
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abilities one can hope to say something about which party to the negotiations may have the 
greatest ability to influence the other.  
 
Issue-specific structural power can be measured by examining the total sum of material 
capabilities of a given state with emphasis on the resources relevant for the issue in question. 
Military, demographic and economic resources can be measured by volume and compared to 
those of the opposing party to the negotiations. Issue-specific power is considered to be the 
relevant aspect of power in negotiations with regards to taxation treaties, and only economic 
capabilities will be measured, because capabilities linked to the military standing of a state is 
considered far less important for issues of taxation.  
    Variables and the Causal Model  2.6
 
This thesis asks two separate, but intrinsically linked questions to be answered. The first 
question addresses how the OECD has proceeded in legitimating the Model Tax Convention, 
and the theoretical background as well as the relevant variables were identifies in section 2.2. 
The second research question asks why countries adhere to this Model Tax Convention. This 
section will present the relevant variables to answer the second question and show how these 
will be used to construct the argument in this thesis.  
 
Moral legitimacy has been defined as conclusions of what the “right thing to do” is, based 
upon positive normative evaluations of what efficiently promotes social welfare. Moral 
legitimacy will be an independent variable in analysing why states adhere to the Model Tax 
Convention. Moral legitimacy is based upon evaluations about whether the Model Tax 
Convention reflects prosocial, morally sound propositions. If the OECD is perceived as 
morally legitimate by states, the Model Tax Convention is more likely to be adhered to than if 
it is perceived as being morally biased or flawed.  
 
Cognitive legitimacy is less dependent upon conscious calculations and evaluations, and is a 
conception of legitimacy without rational deliberations. The concept will also be used as a 
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variable to analyse why states adhere to the Model Tax Convention. If the OECD's policies 
are taken for granted or perceived as so comprehensive that alternatives are not contemplated, 
then it can be said to have obtained cognitive legitimacy. It is therefore less obvious signs 
which may reveal cognitive legitimacy. Statements or actions which signal that no 
calculations or evaluations have been conducted in order to judge the OECD and the content 
of the Model Tax Convention may be signs of cognitive legitimacy.  
 
Self-interests is a variable based upon the realist and liberalist assumption that states act to 
maximise their own interests. In addition to the realist view of states acting to increase their 
own benefit, pragmatic legitimacy is also calculations of the benefit that states obtain. This is 
because pragmatic legitimacy is based upon calculations of states' own gains from policies, 
which corresponds to the realist view. According to both perspectives states will choose to 
adhere to policies which are beneficial to themselves, and will not adhere to policies which 
they consider not to be of benefit. In this thesis, self-interests will be used to analyse why 
countries make reservations to the Model Tax Convention. In this context self-interests will 
be measured by looking at the level of human development and whether a country is capital-
exporting or capital-importing. These measurements are considered to reflect important 
aspects of states' interests.  
 
Negotiation strength is a variable which focuses on the capabilities to negotiate that each 
country possesses. Power in negotiations may influence the direction of negotiations, and thus 
also the level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention. The theoretical background 
presented by Hopmann and Habeeb identified aggregate structural power, issue-specific 
structural power and behavioural power as indicators of how power capabilities may be 
measured. Aggregate structural power is not considered to be relevant in the case of taxation 
matters. As negotiations over taxation are not expected to be of such crucial interest to any 
state that its whole system of capabilities are likely to be mobilised, only the issue-specific 
dimension of structural power is viewed as being of importance. Furthermore, within the 
framework of issue-specific structural power, military capabilities will not be considered, as 
taxation issues are generally not associated with military intervention or conflict. Rather, 
economic capabilities are interpreted as being of the highest importance for the course of 
negotiations, as taxation issues are located within the sphere of economic relations between 
two states. The measurement of structural power capabilities will in this thesis therefore be 
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the volume of each state's economy, where GDP will be used as the indicator. GDP is a 
measurement which reflects the size of the economy of each state. In negotiations over 
taxation treaties this is an important measurement as the economic relationship between the 
two states negotiating is expected to influence the outcome according to realist theories. In 
taxation matters, the economic aspect is considered to be the most influential part of 
negotiation power and will be the focus and the way of measuring negotiation power.  
 
A summary of the variables for answering the second research question can be seen in table 
2.1. 
 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables  
Adherence to the Model Tax Convention Moral Legitimacy 
 Cognitive Legitimacy 
 Self-interests 
 Negotiation Power 
Table 2.1: Variables   
 
To explain variance in adherence, the theoretical framework developed will be used 
extensively. The theoretical concepts provide a broad spectrum of explanatory potential for 
the level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention and the principle of exclusive taxation 
rights to the state of residence for income derived from royalties. It should be noted that other 
factors than the ones outlined here may also be relevant in explaining the variance in 
adherence, but my model includes the most important factors. It is not expected that any of 
the empirical material analysed in later chapters will provide evidence where it is possible to 
say with certainty that only one of the independent variables can fully explain all the variance 
in adherence observed. It is likely that adherence is explained by a mixture of the factors, but 
where one may be dominant. In empirical chapters each relevant independent variable will 
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therefore be considered as having the potential to explain variance in adherence, to a lesser or 
larger degree. 
 
Following the definition of a causal relationship as described by Gerring (2005: 169) the 
independent variables are the cause of the dependent variable if (and only if) they raise the 
probability of the dependent variable. In this thesis, that means that different types of 
legitimacy, self-interests or negotiation power cause the level of adherence if (and only if) 
their existence raise the probability of higher adherence to the Model Tax Convention.  
 Summary 2.7
This chapter has presented selected theoretical contributions which will function as the 
theoretical background for this paper. I started by outlining the theories of legitimacy and 
legitimation which will be used as factors of explanation to answer both research questions. I 
have used Suchman's typology of organisational legitimacy to outline the framework for 
legitimacy and legitimation strategies, with Buchanan and Keohane's complex standard of 
legitimacy as a supporting theory. The variables which will be used to analyse the 
legitimation strategies of the OECD were presented to show how the first research question 
will be answered. The chapter went on to define adherence in theoretical and conceptual 
terms. The factors which will be used to analyse reasons for adherence are based upon the 
general theories of international relations. These were presented before I outlined the more 
specific theories that have derived from realism, liberalism and constructivism. Moral 
legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy, self-interests and power in negotiations were identified as 
the specific theories which I will use as independent variables to explain adherence.  
 
As the theoretical framework and the analytical framework have been presented, the next step 
is to consider the method to be used in this thesis and evaluate the strength of my research 
design. This is undertaken in the next chapter, which is based upon the theories and analytical 
model presented here, but with the aim to take the next step in moving towards analysis by 
presenting the method to be used and the quality of research.  
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3 Method and Quality of Research   
 
 Introduction 3.1
Chapter 2 outlined the formal properties of the argument that will be made in this thesis. The 
causal model which was developed will provide the structure of the argument throughout the 
project. This chapter will turn to the adjoining issue of how the research design is constructed. 
The section will build on the framework of demonstration provided by Gerring (2005: 182-
190) which outlines seven factors which characterise quality in research within the social 
sciences, also referred to by Gerring as methods of proof. These factors are plentitude, 
comparability, independence, representativeness, variation, transparency, and replicability 
(Gerring, 2005: 182). However, Gerring's framework focuses on the criteria that research 
should live up to, and does not offer a more specific method. Therefore, before I turn to 
Gerring's framework for research, I will show how my method falls in line with the method of 
congruence as described by George and Bennett among others. The aim of this chapter as a 
whole is thus to arrive at a better understanding of the dynamics of the research conducted in 
this project, the relationship between variables, and the validity of the project. I will argue that 
the research design is sound and well positioned within the standards of how to conduct 
research in the social sciences, and show evidence of these arguments throughout.  
 
 The Congruence Method 3.2
The congruence method as referred to by George and Bennett's also goes under the name of 
pattern-matching by other scholars. Attractive features of the method include the ability to 
find evidence for causal relationships without extensive data on each case because the 
investigator does not need to trace the causal process in details. The method is also flexible 
and adaptable. Through this method of researching the investigator uses established theory to 
test its ability to explain or predict an outcome (George and Bennett, 2005: 181), which is 
what this thesis aims to do. What the researcher is looking for is the independent variable and 
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the dependent variable to be congruent, meaning that they vary in the expected direction, to 
the expected magnitude, and along expected dimensions (George and Bennett, 2005: 183). 
George and Bennett explains that using the congruence method involves determining the 
value of the independent variable and then use the theory to explain or predict what the 
outcome on the dependent variable will be. If the outcome of the dependent variable is 
consistent with the prediction from the theory there may be a causal relationship (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 181). Although I will start by determining the dependent variables rather than 
the independent variable in empirical chapters 5 and 6, the aim and method still corresponds 
to George and Bennett's writings. The aim is to use existing theory and test the compatibility 
between theory and reality.   
 
Chapter 4 will conduct a theory-guided analysis of the legitimation strategies of the OECD 
with regards to the Model Tax Convention. It will check which one of the legitimation 
strategies presented by Suchman; pragmatic, moral or cognitive legitimation corresponds to 
the trends observed by the OECD. I will bring the information gathered here into the 
following chapters which focus on explaining why states adhere to the Model Tax 
Convention. The legitimation strategies observed may have had an impact on why states 
choose to adhere to the Model Tax Convention, but the other factors represented by the 
independent variables will also be investigated using the congruence method.   
 
Searching for congruity between the independent variables and the dependent variable is the 
central aim of my research. The method which will be used seeks explanations for the level of 
adherence and is thus consistent with the notion of “searching for explanations” or “building 
explanations” (Yin, 1981: 61). Campbell (1975) describes this search for explanations as a 
pattern-matching process whereby theory is tested with regards to its ability to explain 
situations and processes in the empirical world. It is thus not a single variable or factor which 
is being tested, but rather an explanation is tested (Yin. 1981: 62). These descriptions of 
pattern-matching or the method of congruence corresponds to the method used in this thesis. 
The independent variables developed earlier in this chapter represent explanations from 
established theory, which I will use to test the dependent variable of adherence to the Model 
Tax Convention, and find the explanation which matches the patterns in the data material.      
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In addition to establishing explanations, my thesis will also focus on weighing explanations in 
relation to each other. It is unlikely that one explanation is able to account for all the variation 
observed, and several explanations will always exist. That is why I will use the method of 
congruence to establish which explanations seem viable and determine which explanation is 
the most important.     
 
Pattern-matching is the main method which is used in this research project, but I will also 
conduct one interview with an expert informant. The next section will outline the purpose and 
methodological characters of using an expert interview in research.  
 
 Expert Interview 3.3
In order to obtain more direct and detailed information about taxation treaties, how they are 
negotiated and the relationship between the OECD Model Tax Convention and the UN 
Double Taxation Model, I have chosen to conduct one main expert interview. Although my 
written sources satisfy the need for data-material to answer the research questions posed in 
this thesis, the interview is an attempt to obtain information which does not exist as written 
accounts, and which may be able to further expand upon the findings represented in this 
thesis.  
 
The interview in this thesis was conducted with a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance in 
Norway who works with the taxation treaties that Norway has with other states. It is an 
unstructured interview and is inductive in nature. The informant's views are particularly 
emphasised as important, which is in line with constructivist thinking about research and 
interpretation. The aim is to get a comprehensive view of the subjective perceptions of the 
interview object, and I have used purposive selection of the sample.   
 
Standardisation is rarely the aim of expert interviews, and is not the main concern in this 
thesis either. However I recorded the conversation which was transcribed to ensure an 
accurate reproduction of the information gathered. In addition, some considerations should be 
made about the nature of expert interviews in an unstructured mode which will have 
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implications for the data obtained through the interview. Berry (2002: 680) notes that 
interviewers should remember that “It is not the obligation of a subject to be objective and tell 
us the truth. (…) They're talking about their work and, as such, justifying what they do. That's 
no small matter”. Although my informant is not affiliated with any political party and is not 
supposed to bring political preferences into consideration, the informant is likely to be shaped 
by the surroundings. Particularly, I have only conducted an interview with a taxation 
bureaucrat from Norway which, as a typical OECD member state, has different preferences 
and positions than other countries regardless of political management. However, the 
information obtained in the interview takes note of these biases, and the interview is used 
mainly to shed light on processes which are not described in written accounts. Some 
implications for validity and reliability are expanded upon in the next section.  
 
It should be noted that during this project I have had the opportunity to attend the OECD 
Forum 2014 in Paris. This is a conference hosted by the OECD itself which brings together 
policy-makers, civil society, bureaucrats and journalists. During the conference I obtained 
more in-debt knowledge of the OECD as an organisation, and information gathered from the 
speakers and discussions may also have influenced the writing in this thesis. 
 
 The Quality of Research 3.4
Plentitude in Gerring's framework refers to the evidence base of research. According to his 
standard, causal relationships are better tested with more comparative references at hand 
(Gerring, 2005: 182). All other things held equal, larger samples create better evidence to 
support an argument and larger samples help specify a proposition as results are more stable if 
the evidence base is larger.  
 
This thesis draws on several sources of evidence. The Model Tax Convention and the 
extended document published by the OECD, the reservations that states have made towards 
the Model Tax Convention and a sample of bilateral taxation treaties are the main sources of 
information in this project. The document is further outlined in chapter 4 which is based upon 
information communicated by the OECD as an organisational actor. Chapter 5 addresses the 
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reservations which are conveyed in the OECD document. This part of the research project 
uses the entire population of reservations to the principle of exclusive taxation right on the 
income of royalties to the country of residence. The analysis conducted in chapter 5 is thus a 
large-N study where the sample equals the population. Bilateral taxation treaties are used 
primarily in chapter 6. The sample here is smaller, but more refined. Taxation treaties are 
selected based upon the reservation profile of countries made in chapter 5.  
 
The interviews conducted will add insight where it is needed. By using informants with broad 
experience within the field of taxation treaties, data which cannot be obtained from written 
data-material can be brought into the analysis.  
 
In addition to these primary sources, existing literature is consulted and referred to throughout 
the thesis.  
 
Comparability refers to equivalence across cases, or unit homogeneity (Gerring, 2005:183). 
There are two aspects of comparability which should be taken into account, namely 
descriptive comparability and causal comparability (Gerring, 2005: 184-185).  
 
Descriptive comparability means that variables and the meaning behind the concept of the 
variables mean roughly the same thing across cases (Gerring, 2005: 184). The variables 
outlined in the previous chapter will be applicable through the entire thesis. Pragmatic, moral 
and cognitive legitimation will be identified in the same manner throughout the analysis. The 
same is true for moral and cognitive legitimacy, self-interests and negotiation power. 
Adherence as the dependent variable will refer to adherence to the Model Tax Convention 
throughout the thesis.  
 
Causal comparability refers to the similarity between cases, and means choosing cases that are 
similar to each other with regards to the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables (Gerring, 2005: 185). The causal relationship states that legitimacy, 
negotiation power or self-interests cause the level of adherence if (and only if) their existence 
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raise the probability of higher adherence to the Model Tax Convention. The causal 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables is the same for 
both chapter 5 and 6 which focus on the explanatory power of the independent variables on 
the level of adherence. Chapter 4 investigates which legitimation strategies the OECD has 
used and thus has a different logic than the other empirical chapters. However, as this 
question aims to answer a different research question, the causal logic is also different.  
 
Independence of cases address the potential problem of autocorrelation and cases not being 
independent (Gerring, 2005: 185-186).  
 
A problem here may be the differentiation between countries which are members of the 
OECD, and countries which are not members of the OECD. If member-states' adherence is 
influenced by membership in the OECD, there is a chance that they cannot be compared to 
states outside the OECD when it comes to the question of adherence. In fact, as we will see in 
chapter 5 there is a good chance that member-states are indeed more likely to adhere to the 
Model Tax Convention because they are members of the OECD. The lack of independence 
between cases can be controlled via some informal method of control (Gerring, 2005: 186) 
and in my thesis this will be done by not treating member-states of the OECD and non-
member states as the same. Instead, I will be open about the differences and use these as an 
element in my analysis.  
 
Representativeness of cases is another way of referring to the external validity, or the 
comparability between the sample and the population (Gerring, 2005: 186). The central 
question is whether it is possible to generalise the findings from the sample to say something 
about the population as a whole. In chapter 4 I assess the legitimation strategies of the OECD, 
and no generalisation is needed. In chapter 5 I use the entire population which mean that there 
is no sample, and the research is representative by default.  
 
Chapter 6 may represent some selection bias, and the sample may not be representative for the 
entire population of taxation treaties in existence. The fact is that no sample of bilateral 
taxation treaties as small as the one examined here, would be likely to properly represent the 
entire population. However, with a volume of more than 3000 taxation treaties in existence, 
and a qualitative approach to examining them, it would be a task far beyond the scope of this 
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thesis to arrive at a representative sample. The strategy for selecting the sample will however 
be described in detail in chapter 6 and the selection of the sample is properly justified. Thus, I 
believe that the sample in question still has a great value on its own, even though 
generalisations here may be difficult.  
 
Furthermore, the interview conducted may also represent some level of bias. The views 
expressed in the interview may not be representative for all states or actors working with 
taxation treaties worldwide. Therefore, the views expressed are not interpreted as being 
representative for all negotiators or managers of taxation treaties, but rather the information 
obtained is considered valuable insights into the process and purposes related to taxation 
treaties, and are of importance in their own right.  
 
Variation refers to the causal relationship between the variables, and implies that there should 
be some correlation between independent variables and the dependent variable (Gerring, 
2005: 188). The selection of samples should allow for the possibility of variation on the 
dependent variable, according to King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 129). If the dependent 
variable is allowed to vary, then correlation and direction of the relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variables can be determined.   
 
This project is deductive in its nature and will attempt to explore the causal relationship. It 
will try to determine which one of the independent variables has the most explanatory power 
on adherence. Thus, it is difficult to say something about the correlation at this point. 
However, the independent variables have been chosen because I assume that at least one of 
them has the ability to explain variance in adherence. It would be disappointing to conclude 
that none of the independent variables have any variation with the dependent variable. It is 
concluded that the independent variables do correlate with adherence in the empirical 
analysis, and thus variation is present in this research project. The selection of samples will 
focus on finding cases which are expected to have different values on the dependent variables 
and independent variables in order to test the relation. 
 
Transparency is a trait of a research design which provides process-tracing evidence (Gerring, 
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2005: 189). The causal chain must be accounted for in order for this to be the case. 
 
Throughout this thesis I will strive to explain the causal relationship between independent 
variables and the dependent variable. For example, it may be found that moral legitimacy 
explains adherence amongst states. If this is the case, I will go further and make an attempt at 
explaining why moral interests are so dominant that they result in adherence.  
 
Replicability refers to the reliability of the results and the possibility of repeating the study for 
future researchers (Gerring, 2005, 189-190). As the majority of sources used in this thesis are 
readily available to the general public, there is no problem of other researchers finding the 
same material and doing the research again. However, throughout the project I will rest 
findings upon interpretations which are accounted for in the analysis. I believe that 
interpretation is an important tool in understanding the dynamic of processes, and as Adler 
notes, “the material world does not come classified, and, therefore, the objects of our 
knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and our language” (2002: 95). It is clear 
that the interpretations that I make throughout this research project are dependent on me as 
the researcher, and that other researchers may end up at different conclusions than those 
presented here, as in the nature of qualitative research projects. However, in order to ensure 
the replicability of this study, the arguments will be visibly built up and accounted for so that 
others may understand how I have arrived at the conclusions.   
 
The same logic applies to the interview conducted in this thesis. Had other researchers 
conducted the interview it may have unfolded differently and other information may have 
surfaced. Through the same process of making information available to the reader and 
justifying the conclusions that I make based upon this information, I hope that the thesis will 
provide the transparency which is necessary in order for others to reach the same conclusions 
as I have.  
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 Summary 3.5
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the method to be used in the empirical 
chapters and examine the quality of my research design. I will use the method of congruence 
or pattern-matching to investigate whether the independent variables have the power to 
explain the legitimation strategies of the OECD and the level of adherence to the Model Tax 
Convention observed. In answering the first research question of how the OECD has 
legitimated the Model Tax Convention, I will conduct a theory-guided analysis and search for 
the legitimation strategies which best explain the strategy employed by the OECD. Chapters 5 
and 6 both aim to answer the second research question of why countries adhere to the Model 
Tax Convention, and here I will start by determining the level of adherence, or the dependent 
variable, and then find the independent variable(s) which best explain adherence. Where I find 
that several independent variables have congruence with the dependent variable I will 
evaluate the explanations and determine which has the most explanatory power. This chapter 
has also outlines the quality of the research design by following Gerring's criteria for good 
research designs, and found that the research design is sound according to his standards.  
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4 Analysis of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention document and the UN 
Model 
 
 
 Introduction 4.1
The document which the OECD regularly updates and publishes is a source of extended 
information which can be of help when answering the research questions posed in this thesis. 
The first research question specifically address how the OECD has proceeded in legitimating 
the Model Tax Convention, and in analysing how the organisation portrays the model it may 
be possible to find evidence of which independent variable is best able to explain how the 
OECD has gone about in encouraging adherence to the model. By looking at the text that the 
OECD has written to outline and explain the purpose and intention of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, I hope to find some indications of the legitimation strategies of the OECD, based 
on the analytical concepts developed in chapter 3. The way the OECD as an organisation 
portrays the Model Tax Convention can be seen as a way for them to legitimate their own 
policies. As the legitimation strategy of the OECD is the topic of this analysis, the issues of 
negotiation power and self-interest are not relevant. This chapter will start by outlining the 
document in question. It will then go on to look specifically at one part of the document, 
namely the introduction which can be used to understand the intentions of the OECD. In order 
to properly examine the legitimation of the OECD Model Tax Convention, I will also outline 
the alternative UN Model Double Taxation. This model taxation treaty diverts significantly 
from the OECD Model when it comes to policies regarding the taxation of royalties which is 
the particular area of interest for this thesis. Considering this alternative model will place the 
OECD Model Tax Convention into a larger context. The legitimation strategies of the OECD 
will be examined in the last part of the chapter.  
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 The Model Tax Convention and the OECD 4.2
publication 
The OECD Model Tax Convention in itself is only approximately twenty (20) pages long, but 
the full version of the OECD publication which it is part of, exceeds two thousand pages. The 
full document includes not only the Model Tax Convention, but also a range of other 
information. The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs has written an introductory chapter 
which will be central in this chapter of my thesis, and will be outlined in further detail below. 
The Committee consists of representatives from OECD member states who meet annually, 
but the secretariat of the OECD are the ones who carry out the day to day work of this 
Committee (oecd.org, 2014). The full document also includes commentaries relating to each 
Article of the Model Tax Convention, OECD-member state's positions on the Model Tax 
Convention and it's Commentaries, some non-OECD countries' positions on the Model Tax 
Convention and it's Commentaries, as well as twenty-four (24) reports related to the Model 
Tax Convention and Appendixes which outline the tax conventions between OECD member 
countries and some recommendations from the OECD Council (OECD, 2012). Integrated into 
the publication is also a detailed history of all the updates, amendments and exclusions which 
has been made to the Model Tax Convention, the Commentaries, and the positions of both 
OECD members and non-members throughout the years since the first publication was issued 
in 1963. Within this document then, there is extensive information which can be used in order 
to interpret the actual OECD Model Tax Convention, its influence and context. The parts of 
this document which are particularly interesting for this research project are the sections 
outlining member-states' and non-member states' reservations to the Model Tax Convention, 
the OECD introductory chapter and the Model Tax Convention itself. The reservations will be 
dealt with in chapter 5 which will directly analyse reservations. The Model Tax Convention 
and the proposition on exclusive taxation rights for the country of residence was used as a 
source in the introductory chapter, and adherence to this proposition is the topic of chapters 5 
and 6, but is also referred to regularly throughout this thesis. This chapter will focus on the 
OECD's introduction, and the information it provides on OECD's legitimation strategy.   
 
The introduction is about 20 pages long and is written by the OECD's Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs. This Committee consists of representatives from OECD member states and the 
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OECD secretariat that meets annually to review and contribute to the work of the secretariat 
(OECD.org, 2014). As the introduction will be outlined further below, for now it is sufficient 
to say that it contains a section outlining the historical background of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, a section on its influence and a presentation of the Convention. 
 
The Commentaries provided by the OECD is intended to illustrate and interpret each Article's 
provisions (OECD, 2012: I-8). They are not intended to be included in the bilateral taxation 
treaties, but are to be seen as an assisting tool in the application and interpretation of the 
agreements, and to be used as guidelines in the settlement of any disputes if they should arise 
(OECD; 2012: I-9). The Commentaries are very technical and outline different situations 
where countries may experience diverging interests in taxation practises. These are supposed 
to be of guidance for tax authorities, taxpayers and court systems (Appendix 2, 2014 
[interview]). The OECD member state's observations and reservations follow the 
Commentaries of each article. Observations are the main arena for member states to comment 
on the Model Tax Convention themselves if they feel that the OECD Commentaries do not 
suffice to express their intentions, or if the Commentaries fail to capture an aspect of a given 
taxation situation. The reservations are shorter pieces of text which simply express whether or 
not the member countries adhere to the article. In short, observations are related to the 
Commentaries, while reservations are related to the article of the Model Tax Convention 
itself. After each Commentary and the member states' views follow a detailed list of historical 
changes. As the Model Tax Convention is updated regularly, the OECD has decided to 
include this account of historical changes so that anyone can follow the developments of the 
Model Tax Convention, but also the developments of the Commentaries, the observations and 
the reservations. The historical changes are very detailed and usually exceed the 
Commentaries, observations and reservations in length.  
 
The next section of the OECD document is the non-OECD economies' positions on the OECD 
Model Tax Convention. First, a short introduction is given, explaining the reasons behind the 
decision to include non-OECD members' positions on the Model Tax Convention, and 
naming the 31 countries which have been given the opportunity to share their positions. The 
non-member states' positions are limited to outlining, and in some cases (very) briefly 
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explaining, the reservations. The positions are divided into two categories also here, positions 
on the article itself, and on the Commentaries. Positions on the article are very short and 
simple and outline which aspects the non-member countries reserve themselves from. 
Positions on the commentary are marginally more explanatory and state which aspects of the 
Commentaries the non-member states disagree with. However, compared to the member 
states' possibility to share their observations, non-members are not given the opportunity to 
comment further on why they disagree with the Commentaries. A list of historical changes is 
included also here, after the positions on each article. Thus, it is easy to track the development 
of reservations made also by non-member states.  
 
The parts of the OECD document which has been outlined so far constitute Volume I, and 
contain the parts which are of interest for this thesis. Volume II contains reports written by the 
OECD on different aspects which the Model Tax Convention addresses, as well as 
appendixes. Volume II does not address member-states' or non-member states' relationship to 
the Model Tax Convention, nor does it address the OECD's strategy or relationship to the 
Convention, and will therefore not be included in this analysis.  
 
It is therefore Volume I which is the main source of information relating to the research 
questions posed in this thesis. The reservations which both the member states and non-
member states have made will be used extensively in the next chapter to provide a full picture 
of reservations made to Article 12, and to analyse the meaning of these reservations. This 
chapter will now turn to the OECD's Introduction to the Model Tax Convention which is used 
to analyse OECD's strategy for legitimating the Model Tax Convention as a direct way of 
answering the first research question posed.   
 
 OECD's Introduction  4.3
As mentioned briefly above, this introduction written by the OECD's Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs contains the historical background of the Model Tax Convention, an account of the 
influence that the Model Tax Convention has had, and a presentation of the Model Tax 
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Convention. This chapter of the OECD publication differs significantly from the rest of 
Volume I on several points. The other chapters follow a structure based upon the articles of 
the Model Tax Convention, and go through these articles in detail. The Model Tax 
Convention outlines the standards that the OECD recommends to base bilateral taxation 
treaties upon, and the remaining chapters expand upon these and describe them in detail. The 
introduction on the other hand, is a text that flows much more freely and does not follow the 
same pattern. Rather than explaining the articles it focuses on the Model Tax Convention in 
general. It is the views of the OECD that is presented in the introduction, and I expect that the 
OECD will make use of such an opportunity to justify the content of the Model Tax 
Convention, and that it will reflect the legitimation strategies of the OECD. Therefore, I will 
analyse the introductory chapter using the independent variables developed from Suchman's 
categories of legitimation.   
 
The introduction is eleven (11) pages long, and provides important information of the OECD's 
legitimation of the Model Tax Convention. The very first paragraph starts by defining 
juridical double taxation, and stresses that the potential of double taxation has harmful effects 
on the exchange of good and services, and movements of capital, technology and persons 
(OECD, 2012: I-1). It emphasises the shared importance that the OECD member countries put 
on clarifying, standardising and conforming rules of taxation, so that common solutions can 
be found to identical cases of double taxation. The Council of the OECD recommends that 
member countries use the Model Tax Convention, its Commentaries and the reservations and 
positions of other member countries when they deal with negotiating or updating bilateral 
taxation agreements, and also when they apply and interpret the provisions agreed upon in 
these agreements.  
 
The content of the section which outlines the historical background of the Model Tax 
Convention will not be carefully considered here, as the main trends regarding the 
development of the Model Tax Convention were dealt with in the introductory chapter of this 
paper. However, I would like to make some remarks regarding the language used in this 
section. The section stresses the importance of the 1963 publication of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (then entitled “Draft Double Taxation on Income and Capital”) in relation to 
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previous attempts at eliminating double taxation. It notes that no previous attempt at 
multilateral processes had succeeded at being fully and unanimously accepted, and that these 
previous attempts contained gaps and discrepancies (OECD, 2012: I-1 – I-2). The language 
used includes phrases such as “harmonization of these conventions (…) became increasingly 
desirable” and “... a draft convention that would effectively resolve the double taxation 
problem...” (OECD, 2012: I-2), thus portraying the issue of double taxation as an imminent 
problem in the international political economy which the OECD stepped up to efficiently 
resolve. The way in which the sections is written has a clear undertone which portrays the 
OECD Model Tax Convention as a comprehensive document which the international 
community had long awaited.  
 
This portrayal becomes even more evident when the introductory chapter turns to the issue of 
outlining the influence of the OECD Model Tax Convention. This section highlights the wide 
repercussions that the Model Tax Convention has had on negotiations, application, and 
interpretation of taxation agreements. It stresses the major importance that the Model Tax 
Convention has had for OECD member countries. It states that “The existence of the Model 
Convention has facilitated bilateral negotiations between OECD member countries and made 
possible a desirable harmonization between their bilateral conventions for the benefit of both 
taxpayers and national administration” (OECD, 2012: I-4). It uses the increasing number of 
double taxation treaties which has been concluded or revised since the Model Tax Convention 
first appeared, and the fact that taxation treaties between OECD member countries to a large 
extent follow the recommendations and standards provided in the Model Tax Convention, as 
direct measurements of the progress towards eliminating double taxation and the importance 
of the Model Tax Convention (OECD, 2012: I-4). In addition the section emphasise the 
importance of the Model Tax Convention also outside of the OECD member countries; “the 
impact of the Model Convention has extended far beyond the OECD area” (OECD, 2012: I-
4). The fact that it is being used in negotiations between OECD members and non-members, 
and also between two parties which are non-members, is taken as evidence of the growing 
importance of the Convention.  
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The most notable instance of the influence of the Model Tax Convention, it argues, is the 
emergence of the UN Model Double Taxation Convention. The OECD stresses how it 
reproduces a significant part of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which is interpreted as 
clear proof of the Model Tax Convention's influence beyond the OECD sphere (OECD, 2012: 
I-4). The UN Model and its relationship to the OECD Model Tax Convention will be 
expanded upon in the next section.  
 
Lastly the section on the Model Tax Convention's influence notes that the worldwide 
recognition of the Model Tax Convention's interpretation in the Commentaries has given the 
world a common standard upon which to agree and interpret double taxation treaties. It also 
states that as the network of such taxation treaties expands, the provisions of the Model Tax 
Convention will continue to increase in significance.  
 
These phrasings of the introductory chapter for the Model Tax Convention document 
published by the OECD makes it clear that the OECD views this particular Model for taxation 
agreements to be of vital importance with regards to concluding and interpreting taxation 
agreements bilaterally. The OECD portrays the Model as the most important tool for 
negotiating taxation treaties, which has had extensive influence within the OECD and beyond. 
The introduction does not explicitly justify the morality of the Model Tax Convention, but 
rather takes the moral standing of the Model Tax Convention for granted. Similarly, the 
benefits states have in using the Model Tax Convention are not justified or discussed, but 
instead the OECD take it as a given that the Model will serve the interests of states. These 
aspects and implications of legitimation strategies will be returned to in section 4.5, but first 
the UN Model Double Taxation Convention will be examined to help shed light on the 
positioning of the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
 
 
 
52 
 
 The UN Model Double Taxation Convention and 4.4
its relationship to the OECD Model Tax Convention 
The UN Model Double Taxation Convention is an alternative model for negotiating and 
concluding taxation treaties between countries. Four years after the first OECD Model Tax 
Convention was published in 1963 as the “Draft Double Taxation on Income and Capital” 
(OECD, 2012: I-1 – I-2) the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) 
adopted a resolution which recognised the desirability of a model for taxation treaties between 
developed and developing countries (UN, 2011: vii).  The 1963 OECD Draft Double Taxation 
on Income and Capital was met with considerable scepticism from developing countries who 
felt that the Convention deprived them of tax income which they needed in order to facilitate 
development (Brooks, 2007:175). The UN Model thus emerged as a result of developing 
countries' dissatisfaction with the initial OECD Model Tax Convention. The OECD Draft was 
being used as a guide in taxation treaty negotiations between developed and developing 
countries despite the Draft being the result of negotiations only within the OECD member 
states (Surrey, 1980: 7). The Secretary-General of the United Nations responded to the 
resolution by initiating the “Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed 
and Developing Countries” in 1968 (UN, 2011: vii) with the purpose of addressing 
developing countries' suspicious attitudes towards the OECD Model Tax Convention and the 
differences in ideological approaches (Surrey, 1980: 7). The Ad Hoc Group of Experts 
concluded its work in 1979 and the first UN Double Taxation Convention was approved by 
ECOSOC in 1980 (UN, 2011: vii-viii).  
 
The Ad Hoc Group of Experts consisted of tax officials and experts from both developed and 
developing countries and the members were appointed due to their experience and expertise 
within taxation matters, and were representatives in their personal capacity (UN, 2011: vii). 
During the discussions which lead to the publication of the first UN Model Convention in 
1980, the OECD Draft from 1963 was used as a basic guide to facilitate orderly discussions 
(Surrey, 1980: 7). However, the result published in 1980 diverted from the OECD Draft with 
regards to the content of the propositions. The main divergence between the two models, in 
1980 as well as today is the OECD bias towards taxation in the residence country and the UN 
bias towards taxation in the source country. An important assumption of the OECD was that 
“the country of source will considerably reduce both the scope of its jurisdiction to tax at 
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source and the rates of tax where jurisdiction is retained”, which was an assumption that 
developing countries did not accept (Surrey, 1980: 8-9). After the UN Group of Experts had 
discussed and negotiated, they ended up with propositions which generally favoured retention 
of greater source country taxation rights (UN, 2011: VI).  
 
The difference in emphasis on taxation in the state of residence versus the source state 
becomes evident if we turn to the paragraphs of each model which considers the taxation of 
royalties. Due to the subtle nuances in the language used however, the difference may not be 
immediately evident. The OECD Model Tax Convention states that: “Royalties arising in a 
Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State shall be 
taxable only in that other State” (OECD, 2012: M-34). Through this paragraph the OECD 
establishes the principle of exclusive taxation rights of royalty payments to the state of 
residence by using “...shall be taxable only in that other State” (OECD, 2012: M-34, emphasis 
by author). The Article then goes on to define royalty payments and some special exceptions. 
This zero-rate on taxation of royalties in the source state was not accepted by developing 
countries (Surrey, 1980: 40). The UN Model Double Taxation Convention therefore, states 
that: “Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting 
State may be taxed in that other State” (UN, 2011: 18). The language of the paragraph is 
indeed very similar to that of the OECD, but the proposition therein differs in meaning due to 
the use of the wording “may be taxed in that other State” (UN, 2011: 18, emphasis by author). 
Furthermore, the UN Model does not immediately move on to define royalties, but adds an 
important second paragraph which states that: “However, such royalties may also be taxed in 
the Contracting State in which they arise and according to the laws of that State, but if the 
beneficial owner of the royalties is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so 
charged shall not exceed ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of the royalties” (UN, 2011: 18-19). Through these two 
paragraphs the UN establishes the principle of shared taxation rights between the state of 
residence and the source state, with the specific rate of taxation left up to bilateral 
negotiations. In both the OECD and the UN Models these paragraphs establish the distributive 
rules of taxation of royalties. In international law, as Vogel (1986) notes, the “shall....only” 
formulation of the OECD Model Tax Convention is a distributive rule with complete legal 
consequences, while the use of “may” in the UN Model is a distributive rule with incomplete 
or open legal consequences (Vogel, 1986: 27). The consequence for the enforcement of 
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taxation treaties is that a distributive rules with complete legal consequences requires the 
source state to exempt the income from its tax. If distributive rules with incomplete or open 
legal consequences are established then the rule does not determine the consequences for the 
source state in itself (Vogel, 1986: 27). It should be noted that with regards to the model 
taxation treaties, neither the OECD Model Tax Convention nor the UN Model Double 
Taxation Convention are legally binding in themselves. However, the taxation treaties that 
countries negotiate are legally binding, and the implications for taxation law of following the 
different models become relevant when the bilateral taxation treaties are concluded.    
 
When the OECD stresses how the UN Model reproduces a significant part of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention in the introduction text which was topic for the previous section, and 
interprets this as clear proof of the Model Tax Convention's influence beyond the OECD 
sphere (OECD, 2012: I-4), the OECD neglects to be open about the nature of the UN 
“reproduction”. The UN Model does indeed follow the same structure and outline as the 
OECD Model in the sense that the articles and paragraphs are build up in the same manner. 
However, the guidelines differ considerably in nature. When analysing and comparing the two 
models what is interesting is not primarily the structure and the numbering of articles, but the 
policy choices that they advocate. The implications that this representation that the OECD use 
has for its legitimation strategies will be considered in the next section.    
 
Before we turn to the analysis of OECD's legitimation strategy, it should be emphasised that 
the difference in taxation policies that the two models advocate has large implications in 
economic terms. The consequences of following one model instead of the other are large with 
regards to the taxation income of the states involved. It is difficult, if not impossible (at least 
within the scope of this thesis) to estimate the economic consequences of choosing one model 
over the other. However, one may imagine a scenario where two states sign a taxation treaty 
based upon the UN Model where taxation rights of royalties are shared equally between the 
states. That means that all “payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or 
the right to use, any copy-right of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph 
films, (or films or tapes used for radio or television broadcasting,) any patent, trade-mark, 
design or model, plan, secret formula or process, (or for the use of, or the right to use, 
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment) or for information concerning industrial, 
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commercial or scientific experience”1 (OECD, 2012: M-34 & UN, 2011: 19) are to be shared 
equally between the two states. If however the states have based their bilateral taxation treaty 
upon the OECD Model Tax Convention these payments would be taxable only in the state of 
residence. When considering such an example it becomes evident that we are concerned with 
large amounts of taxation income, and the choice of which double taxation model to use is not 
a trivial matter. 
 
The UN Model Double Taxation Convention is thus an alternative tool to base bilateral 
taxation treaties upon, and is specifically designed for negotiations between developed and 
developing countries. The Model diverts from the OECD Model Tax Convention with regards 
to the policy on where to tax royalties and advocates shared taxation rights between the states 
of residence and the source state, rather than exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence. 
The difference in policy has implications for taxation law and economic outcomes, despite the 
OECD portraying the UN Model as nearly a reproduction of the OECD Model.  
 
 OECD's Legitimation Strategy    4.5
This chapter has outlined the content of the OECD publication, particularly the introduction to 
the document as written by the OECD itself, as well as the UN Model Double Taxation 
Convention and how it compares to the Model Tax Convention of the OECD. The next point 
of interest is to understand how the OECD text relates to legitimation strategies that the 
OECD has employed. To answer the research question posed in this thesis, this section will 
try to determine which independent variable within the legitimation framework can explain 
OECD’s strategy. In order to ensure transparency, the discussion will provide detailed 
evidence of how conclusions have been reached.  
 
The introductory text does not refer extensively to the self-interests that states have in signing 
taxation treaties based upon the OECD Model Tax Convention. The text emphasises the 
importance of the Model Tax Convention in international taxation matters, but does not go 
into the details of how taxation treaties benefit individual states. The benefits that each 
                                                 
1 Emphasised text only present in the UN Model Double Taxation Convention (2011: 19). The remaining text 
is identical in both the UN Model Double Taxation Convention and the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
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country would gain from accepting the Model Tax Convention are not highlighted through the 
OECD introductory chapter, leaving no explicit ground for indicating exchange legitimacy 
within the pragmatic legitimation framework. There is however a more subtle undertone in 
the text which indicates that states have an interest in the OECD taking on the role as the 
protector of taxation matters internationally. “It has long been recognised among the member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development that it is 
desirable to clarify, standardise, and confirm the fiscal situation of taxpayers (...)” (OECD, 
2012: I-1). Through statements like this, the OECD indicates that the organisation has 
responded to the needs of the member countries. In addition, there are no references to the 
values that the Convention is built upon, and therefore no grounds for states to compare their 
own dispositional attributes to those of the OECD. In other words, there is no evidence of 
legitimation based upon pragmatic dispositional matching between the audience and the 
organisation. Even the section of the introductory chapter which outlines the influence of the 
Model Tax Convention focus mainly on how the use of the Convention has spread, and lacks 
mention of its benefit for adhering states. This general lack of focus on benefits for states does 
not provide sufficient evidence of a pragmatic legitimation strategy from the OECD. 
 
Neither does the text explicitly use normative arguments to explain how and why the OECD 
Model Tax Convention is the best way to address the issue of double taxation. There is even 
less focus on moral calculations in the introductory text. The few references that are made 
about the benefits of the Model Tax Convention address the economic challenge of double 
taxation, rather than the challenges for social welfare. In terms of consequential legitimation, 
no effort is made to justify the content of the Model Tax Convention as an accomplishment of 
the OECD in a normative light, and similarly, the structure of the OECD are not referred to in 
normative terms, leaving no evidence of structural legitimation efforts. Procedural 
legitimation refers to the moral standing of the OECDs practices, and the OECD does 
emphasise the inclusion of positions, observations and reservations from member and non-
member states in their introduction. Particularly the inclusion of states who are not members 
of the OECD may be interpreted as a step towards increasing procedural legitimacy. Although 
the reasons presented for including non-OECD states are directed towards the benefits these 
inputs will have for the OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs in assisting the continued 
updating of the Model Tax Convention (OECD, 2012: I-3), rather than focusing on the 
democratic perspective of a more inclusive process, the step can still be seen as evidence for 
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strengthening procedural legitimacy. The OECD may realise that appearing more inclusive in 
their work will lead states to view the organisation as having fair and pro-social practices, and 
therefore include non-OECD member countries in their processes as a legitimation strategy 
aimed at increasing moral legitimacy. The introductory chapter to the Model Tax Convention 
thus provides no evidence of consequential or structural legitimation strategies, but show 
evidence of steps taken in order to increase the procedural legitimacy of the OECD.  
 
Cognitive legitimation strategies can be recognised in the text. Cognitive legitimacy is based 
upon a less conscious understanding of something as comprehensible, or that something is 
taken for granted (Suchman, 1995: 582). Rather than explicitly trying to defend or promote 
the OECD Model Tax Convention, the OECD use selective argumentation and conceal 
information in order to implicitly promote the Model Tax Convention.  
 
The way in which the OECD portrays the UN Model Tax Convention is the clearest case in 
point. Rather than mentioning the reasons for the emergence of the UN Model as a response 
to the dissatisfaction with the OECD Model, the OECD points to the similar structure which 
is reproduced. Thus it sounds like the UN Model is practically the same as the OECD Model, 
while in fact the content and guidelines often reflect completely different policies, as section 
4.4 concluded. After all, it is the content of the policies we should be concerned with, not 
primarily the structure and the fact that the articles in the UN Model are numbered in the 
same way as the OECD Model Tax Convention. The differences between favouring exclusive 
taxation rights to the income from royalty payments to the state of residence, and advocating 
shared taxation rights or more source country bias, are many and important. As we have seen, 
the consequences for income to the state are potentially extremely large. Portraying the UN 
Model as practically a copy of the Model Tax Convention is therefore misleading. When 
discussing the influence of the Model Tax Convention the OECD states: “Most notably, it has 
been used as the basis for the original drafting and the subsequent revision of the United 
Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, 
which reproduces a significant part of the provisions and Commentaries of the OECD Model 
Convention” (OECD, 2012: I-4). This excerpt represents the only mention of the UN Model 
Double Taxation Convention in the OECD introductory chapter. Knowing of the historical 
reasons for why the UN Model emerged, it appears that the OECD is trying to conceal 
important information from the reader. Concealing this aspect is foremost evidence of how 
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the OECD omits important information in order to portray the OECD Model Tax Convention 
as the obvious choice for constructing bilateral taxation treaties.  
 
Similarly, the introduction does not go into the nature of double taxation and its harmful 
effects on economic activity. In fact, this aspect is not addressed in the entire OECD 
publication. Rather than showing how double taxation can harm economic activity across 
borders and may cause companies or individuals to refrain from investing abroad or 
diversifying production in different countries, the OECD text simply states in the very first 
paragraph that the harmful effects of double taxation “...are so well known that it is scarcely 
necessary to stress the importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to 
the development of economic relations between countries” (OECD, 2012: I-1). The 
introduction, or the full publication for that matter, never mentions why domestic taxation 
laws are not sufficient and bilateral taxation treaties are needed. Nor does it reflect on why 
bilateral taxation treaties are the best option for avoiding double taxation rather than a 
potential multilateral taxation treaty. The introduction claims that the increasing 
interdependence and co-operation of states in the international global economy is one of the 
main reasons why such a Model Conventions is needed (OECD, 2012: I-2), but economic 
activity is often not limited to one or two countries. In order to avoid double taxation for 
multinational corporations, it may be more convenient to have a multilateral taxation treaty 
which could be better suited to deal with the increasing interdependence of economic activity. 
The General Agreement Regarding Fiscal Cooperation of the OCAM-states from 1971 or the 
taxation treaty between the Nordic Countries are examples of multilateral taxation treaties 
(Vogel, 1986: 13). Sol Picciotto (2012) amongst others, go even further and argue for a 
unitary taxation system which encompasses all states. He uses claims that the current 
international taxation system is not suited to properly tax multinational companies, as the 
system was constructed a century ago, and does not take into account the global nature of 
economic activity today. These questions are not addressed in the OECD text, even though 
they are highly relevant for a Model Convention which deals with matters of international 
taxation. This again points towards the OECD using very selective argumentation in their 
promotion of the importance of the Model Tax Convention.  
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The findings above can be supported by linking the introduction to the proceeding chapters of 
this thesis on bilateral taxation treaties. The OECD introduction stresses the influence of the 
Model Tax Convention by looking at how an increasing number of taxation treaties have been 
based upon the OECD Model Tax Convention, and by stressing the importance that OECD 
member countries have put upon creating standardised guidelines for bilateral taxation 
treaties. However, as we shall see later on, many bilateral taxation treaties are not simply 
based upon the OECD Model Tax Convention, but adhere also or in some cases even more, to 
the UN Model Convention. It will also become evident that not all member countries adhere 
to all the principles put forward in the Model Tax Convention, as can be indicated by the 
number of reservations that member countries conclude. These facts again show how the 
OECD chooses to omit important aspects of the international response to the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, and instead focus on portraying it as the obvious choice of model to base 
bilateral taxation treaties upon. 
 
The findings above indicate how the OECD is using cognitive language and argumentation to 
legitimate the Model Tax Convention. By concealing important aspects, by failing to address 
the limitations of the Model Tax Convention and the criticisms, the OECD portrays the Model 
Tax Convention as the obvious and most influential model. The OECD wishes to show how 
the Model Tax Convention is important and make an attempt to show how it should be taken 
for granted that it will be used by countries that are negotiating taxation treaties, rather than 
viewing it as a choice. By not explaining the differences between the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and other existing models, most notably the UN Model, it indicates that the 
OECD Model is the comprehensible alternative. It merely mentions the UN Model, and when 
it does, it is to show how it has been influenced by the OECD Model. On the basis of these 
observations, I find that there is no evidence to support pragmatic legitimation strategies and 
limited evidence of moral legitimation strategies, but that the OECD is using cognitive 
legitimation strategies to portray the OECD Model Tax Convention as legitimate. 
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 Summary 4.6
This chapter has focused on the document published by the OECD which contains not only 
the Model Tax Convention is itself, but also a number of other sections which help give 
meaning to the Model Tax Convention. The content was outlined in order to provide a clearer 
picture of the context in which the Model Tax Convention exists, and how the OECD puts a 
considerable amount of emphasis on explaining it and providing tools for negotiations. 
Furthermore, the chapter paid particular attention to the introductory chapter, as this section 
differs from the remaining parts of the publication and can be seen as an attempt from the 
OECD to legitimate the document. The alternative model for negotiating bilateral taxation 
treaties that the UN Model Double Taxation Convention provides was also presented from a 
historical view. This was done in order to shed light on the context in which the OECD Model 
Tax Convention has developed and exists, and to evaluate the claims of the OECD in its 
introductory chapter to the Model Tax Convention. The analysis of the introductory section 
found that the OECD does not explicitly focus on the benefits of the Model Tax Convention 
for states wishing to negotiate a bilateral taxation treaty. Furthermore, it found that the moral 
justification for setting these standards have not been highlighted by the OECD in terms of 
the consequential or the structural legitimacy of the Model Tax Convention. Taking the step 
of including non-OECD member countries into the process of evaluating the Model Tax 
Convention can however be seen as a strategy for increasing the procedural legitimacy. The 
justification for including non-member states have been argued for by using the benefits these 
inputs provides for the OECD itself, but the move may have been taken in order to increase 
moral legitimacy. However, cognitive legitimation strategies from the OECD seem to be the 
most apparent as demonstrated by the concealing of important aspects, failing to address the 
limitations of the Model Tax Convention and the criticisms which have been voiced against it. 
The OECD portrays the Model Tax Convention as the obvious and most influential model. 
Taking steps to increase the moral legitimacy of the Model Tax Convention, while failing to 
openly explain the nature of this strategy seems to correspond to the predominant cognitive 
legitimation strategy.  
 
 
61 
 
5 Analysis of Reservations  
 
 Introduction  5.1
The focus for analysis so far in this thesis has been the first research question which addresses 
the legitimation strategies of the OECD. The previous chapter found that the OECD has used 
mainly cognitive legitimation strategies to justify the Model Tax Convention. This chapter 
will shift the focus towards the second research question posed, the aim of which is to 
discover why countries adhere to the Model Tax Convention. Several sources of information 
will be used to answer this question, and in this chapter the reservations that countries have 
made, or not made, will be the main focus. Chapter 6 will look at a sample of actual bilateral 
taxation treaties, but in order to have a good understanding of why these follow the provisions 
of the OECD or not, the reservation system will be outlined. As this chapter will demonstrate, 
reservations are important pieces of information which reflect the dependent variable of 
adherence.  
 
Instead of looking at the OECD as an organisation, this chapter will turn to the responses of 
countries to the Model Tax Convention.  
 
The reservations that countries make can be seen as a direct indication of lower adherence to 
the Model Tax Convention. If a country does not agree with an aspect of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, the best way to show this and to act upon the disagreement is to reserve 
itself from having to adhere to this aspect. Countries are encouraged by the OECD to respect 
not only the guidelines that the Model Tax Convention provides and the Commentaries to 
interpret them, but also each individual country's reservations when conducting bilateral 
negotiations. Looking at the reservations is therefore a solid way to understand how OECD 
member countries' as well as non-member countries' attitudes are towards the Model Tax 
Convention. However, the scope of this chapter will not be to look at all the reservations 
made. Rather, attention will be focused on countries' attitudes towards the article of the Model 
Tax Convention which deals with withholding tax on royalties which is the focus of this 
thesis. This topic is covered in Article 12 of the Model Tax Convention. Paragraph 1 of this 
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article lays out the principle of exclusive taxation rights to the country of residence. 
Reservations to this particular paragraph are therefore the main focus throughout this chapter.    
 
In order to clarify the level of adherence to the OECD Model Tax Convention, it would be 
desirable to compare these reservations to those of a comparable model for negotiating 
taxation treaties. Chapter 4 considered the UN Model Double Taxation Convention and found 
that this model advocated a different policy on where to tax royalties, which favoured source 
countries to a greater extent than the OECD does. Therefore, ideally we would be able to look 
at state's attitudes towards the UN Model and compare the adherence of the UN Model to that 
of the OECD Model. If a state had reserved the right to tax royalties at source in the OECD 
Model, but had made no reservation to the UN principle of shared taxation, adherence to the 
OECD Model would be even lower. Similarly, if a country had not reserved itself from the 
OECD principle of taxing royalties in the state of residence, but had reserved itself from the 
principle of shared taxation in the UN Model, adherence to the OECD Model would be 
strengthened. Comparing adherence to the OECD Model Tax Convention with adherence to 
the UN Model would allow for a clear picture of state's preferences and a more nuanced 
picture of adherence.  
 
While such comparisons would be useful, the UN Model has been developed by the Group of 
Experts at the ECOSOC and not by states. Furthermore, the UN Model (as the OECD Model) 
is not a legally binding document, but a Convention made with the purpose of assisting states 
in their negotiations over bilateral taxation treaties. The sum of these factors means that states 
do not have the opportunity to sign or ratify the UN Model. In addition, the UN Model does 
not contain a system of reservations, and states do not have the opportunity to make 
observations, reservations or positions on the propositions. The ECOSOC is considering the 
possibility of introducing a system of including the views of states into the UN Model Double 
Taxation Convention (UN, 2011b). If the next revision of the UN Model includes such a 
system, this would be an interesting way to further analyse the level of adherence to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention as well as the UN Model Double Taxation Convention more 
precisely, which researchers should consider following up.   
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This chapter is an attempt to understand how countries, both as members of the OECD and 
non-members, perceive the Model Tax Convention. Through looking at the reservations I 
hope to find indicators of whether or not countries tend to adhere to the principle of exclusive 
taxation rights for the state of residence. Reservations are, in this sense, indicators of the level 
of adherence which is the dependent variable of this study. Reservations and thus adherence 
will be explained through an analysis of the independent variables, in order to understand 
whether calculations of different types of legitimacy or self-interests can explain adherence, in 
line with the causal model which was developed in chapter 3. As the power in negotiations is 
a relational explanatory factor, and the reservations are made by one country alone, the 
independent variable of negotiation power is not relevant for explaining adherence in this 
chapter, and will therefore be excluded. The reservation picture developed in this chapter will 
be the basis for the selection of bilateral taxation treaties to be analysed in the proceeding 
chapter on bilateral taxation treaties. I will include all the countries involved and all the 
reservations made, and the analysis will thus consider the entire population at hand. Not all 
countries in the world are included in the process of reviewing the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, but the 63 countries that are involved are included in the analysis. In terms of 
Gerring's criteria for good research, this means that the sample analysed is indeed 
representative for the population because the entire available population is considered. In 
addition the analysis allows the dependent variable to vary because both countries with and 
without reservations are taken into account, thus improving variation.   
 
 Reservations to Article 12, Paragraph 1  5.2
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, reservation can be regarded as disagreement 
with certain provisions of the Model Tax Convention, thus indicating lower adherence. If a 
country has reserved itself from any aspect of the Convention, the other country is encouraged 
to forgo their right to follow this provision, but according to the reciprocity principle that the 
other part will do the same in another situation (OECD, 2012: I-10). It must however be noted 
that when the OECD makes this statement it is only with regards to member countries. Non-
OECD member states are also allowed to submit their reservations, but interestingly no 
statement similar to the one above stating that the other party to negotiations have to retain 
their rights is explicitly mentioned.  
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Like Rudyk and Vega (2011:3), who have previously used reservations as indicators for 
disagreement with the OECD Model Tax Convention, it is important to note at the outset that 
a reservation does not mean an intention to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions, which is the technical meaning of a reservation according to Art.2 (1) (d) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). The reason for this deviation is that the 
OECD Model Tax Convention is a Model rather than a treaty in itself. With regards to the 
bilateral taxation treaties this is different, as the reservations are taken into account before the 
treaty is agreed upon and reservations are thus not made directly towards the taxation treaty. 
Reservations thus mean disagreement with the Convention text and are interpreted as 
indicating non-adherence to the specific provision the reservation is made towards, rather than 
to the Convention as a whole.  
 
In order to get an indication of how many countries that have made reservations to aspects of 
Article 12, I have coded OECD member countries and non-members countries. The full tables 
can be found in appendix 1, while tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a summary of reservations. The 
source of information is the OECD publication. Column 1 in tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows 
countries which have opted to fully reserve the right to tax royalties at source. These countries 
do not agree with the principle laid out in the Model Tax Convention, and do not adhere to the 
principle of exclusive taxation in the state of residence. Column 2 shows the countries which 
have partially reserved themselves from the OECD principle of exclusive taxation rights to 
the state of residence. Partial reservations may include special treatments of certain royalties 
e.g. those arising from copyrights on artistic work. Column 3 shows the countries that have 
not made any reservations to the OECD principle of taxing royalties exclusively in the state of 
residence. These countries fully adhere to the Model Tax Convention and have not indicated 
any disagreement with the OECD with regards to Article 12, Paragraph 1. 
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Reserve the full right to tax 
royalties at source 
Partial reservations to the principle 
of exclusive taxation rights to the 
state of residence 
Adhere to the principle of taxing 
royalties exclusively in the state 
of residence 
Australia Canada Austria 
Chile Czech Republic Belgium 
Korea Germany Denmark 
Mexico Greece Estonia 
New Zealand Italy Finland 
Poland  France 
Portugal  Hungary 
Slovak Republic  Iceland 
Slovenia  Ireland 
Turkey  Israel 
  Japan 
  Luxembourg 
  Netherlands 
  Norway 
  Spain 
  Sweden 
  Switzerland 
  United Kingdom 
  United States 
Total: 10 Total: 5 Total: 19 
Table 5.1: OECD member countries' reservations 
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Reserve the full right to 
tax royalties at source 
Partial reservations to the 
principle of exclusive 
taxation rights to the state 
of residence 
Adhere to the principle of taxing royalties exclusively in the 
state of residence 
Albania India United Arab Emirates 
Argentina   
Armenia   
Belarus   
Brazil   
Bulgaria   
Croatia   
DR Congo   
Gabon   
Hong Kong, China   
Indonesia   
Ivory Coast   
Kazakhstan   
Latvia   
Lithuania   
Malaysia   
Morocco   
China   
Philippines   
Romania   
Russia   
Serbia   
South Africa   
Thailand   
Tunisia   
Ukraine   
Vietnam   
Total: 27 Total: 1 Total: 1 
Table 5.2: Non-OECD member countries' reservations 
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 Trends among OECD member states  5.3
Before turning to the issue of explaining these reservations we need a more thorough 
understanding of the reservation picture which has been presented in the tables above. This 
section and the next two will therefore identify some trends which can be found in these 
reservations. This section will briefly analyse the member countries and will look at which 
types of countries tend to make reservations with reference to whether the state has been a 
member of the OECD since its beginning, the level of human development and level of 
capital export. The data used to explore these potential trends is found through lists of 
member countries at the start of the OECD as an organisation, lists of human development 
according to the human development index (HDI) and data from the World Bank on FDI 
outflows. I have used these data to discover whether there are common features which seem 
to correspond among countries with reservations and countries without reservations.  
 
From table 5.1 information can be found regarding OECD member countries. Ten out of 34 of 
the member states choose to reserve themselves from Paragraph 1 of Article 12. In 1961 
OECD's predecessor, the OEEC gained three more members and was established as the 
OECD. The original founding members of the OECD are for the most part in the group of 
member countries who have not reserved themselves from taxing royalties in the state of 
residence only. Portugal and Turkey are the exceptions to this, and are the only two out of 
twenty original founding members who have reserved themselves from this principle. The 
overwhelming support for the Model Tax Convention from the part of the original founding 
members may signal that those member countries that have been committed to the OECD 
from the beginning are more likely to adhere to the Model Tax Convention.  
 
Another trend can be found by looking at the human development index. Although all 
member countries belonging to the OECD are placed in the category of very high or high 
human development, variation can be found. If we rank the OECD member countries in order 
of HDI score from highest to lowest, I find that the countries that have chosen to reserve 
themselves from the principle of exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence are 
generally placed towards the bottom of the list. The seven countries at the bottom of the list 
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are Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Chile, Portugal, Mexico and Turkey (from highest to lowest), 
and out of these countries only Hungary has not made a reservation to the paragraph. Thus, at 
the bottom of the HDI ranking list there seems to be a trend of making reservations to the 
paragraph. The remaining list however, is more random and it should be noted that the second 
country on the list, namely Australia has also made a reservation. This modest trend reflects a 
propensity of highly developed countries to be more likely to adhere to the Model Tax 
Convention.  
 
The OECD Model Tax Convention has been said to be biased in favour of capital-exporting 
countries due to its bias for states of residence taxation (e.g. Brooks, 2007: 172). Usually it is 
referred to OECD member states as being the main beneficiaries of the provisions inherent in 
the Model Tax Convention. If we rank the member states according to their capital-exporting 
capabilities, similar trends can be found. Using data from the World Bank on capital export 
(FDI is seen as the best indicator) as a percentage of GDP from 2012 only (worldbank.org), I 
find that the majority of OECD member countries are indeed capital-exporting countries. The 
countries that are not capital-exporting are generally either countries who have suffered under 
the current financial crisis (Iceland and Greece) or countries who have reserved themselves 
from the principle of exclusive taxation rights for royalties to the state of residence. There is 
thus a modest trend towards the most capital-exporting intensive countries being represented 
among the countries that have not made reservations to Paragraph 1 of Article 12, while the 
less capital-export intensive countries and the capital-importing countries tend to have made 
reservations. This may indicate that capital-exporting countries are indeed those who benefit 
the most from taxing royalties in the state of residence.  
 
In summary, there seems to be an overall trend towards original members of the OECD with a 
high level of human development and capital-export intensive economies, being the most 
likely to adhere to the OECD Model Tax Convention, based on the reservations made. This 
observation falls in line with expectations based on claims made by others (Brooks, 2007 and 
Rudyk and Vega, 2011) that the OECD Model Tax Convention is an instrument mainly 
designed to benefit the rich developed countries. Rudyk and Vega (2011) statistically test the 
hypothesis that export-importing countries are more likely to submit reservations to the Model 
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Tax Convention in general, and find that their data supports the hypothesis. Although Brooks 
(2007) focus mainly on the differences between developed and developing the observations 
discovered here seem to confirm that these trends also hold for explaining variation within 
OECD membership countries. Thus, these findings adds to the existing literature on who 
benefits from the provisions of the Model Tax Convention, by observing that the level of 
adherence to the principle of exclusive taxation rights of royalties to the state of residence 
also differs within OECD member states.   
 
 Trends among OECD non-member states 5.4
Table 5.2 represents the reservations made by non-OECD member countries. The table shows 
that reservations to Paragraph 1 of Article 12 are very common among countries which are 
not members of the OECD. Only two countries out of a possible twenty-nine (29) have not 
fully reserved the right to tax royalties at source, which is the recommendation from the 
OECD. The two exceptions are India and the United Arab Emirates who experience medium 
and very high human development. India is a net capital importer, while the World Bank does 
not have data on the United Arab Emirates (World Bank, 2013). Among the countries who 
have made reservations to the exclusive right to tax royalties in the state of residence, all 
levels of human development are represented, as well as both countries who are net capital 
exporters and importers. In other words, it is difficult to find any trends along the same 
dimensions as above with regards to OECD non-member states.  
 
However, one thing is clear. The main trend to be observed among OECD non-member states 
is that an overwhelming majority of them opt to reserve the right to tax royalties at source. 
The next section will address the variation between member and non-member states with 
regards to reservations.     
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 Differences between OECD member states and 5.5
non-member states 
Based upon the codings of table 5.1 and 5.2 and the observations of general trends expanded 
upon above, it is evident that the main trends of reservations is that while the majority of 
OECD member states do not reserve the right to tax royalties at source, an overwhelming 
majority of OECD non-member states do. While only just under 30% of OECD members 
reserve this right, more than 90% of states not part of the OECD do, regardless of level of 
development or capital exporting capabilities. It is thus clear that OECD member states are 
more likely to adhere to the OECD principle than non-OECD states.  
 
 Explaining Adherence 5.6
What has been demonstrated above is that OECD member states tend to be less likely to 
reserve themselves from the principle of exclusive rights to tax royalties in the state of 
residence than non-member states are. This section will try to determine the underlying 
explanations for these trends in terms of the independent variables identified in this thesis in 
order to answer the second research question. I will do so by starting with the framework for 
legitimacy as explanatory factors, and then turn to the self-interest explanation. As the 
introduction to this chapter noted, the independent variable of negotiation power will not be 
included in the analysis here as it is not a relevant factor for the analysis. In order to improve 
transparency as a factor of good research described by Gerring (2005), each independent 
variable will be discussed properly in this section to allow readers to understand how I have 
arrived at conclusions.  
 
Moral legitimacy is the first possible explanation for adherence. The fact that member 
countries of the OECD are more likely to adhere to the Model Tax Convention than countries 
which are not members, may have something to do with their view on the organisation's moral 
standing. Particularly, Suchman defines procedural legitimacy as a form of moral legitimacy 
where the organisation is perceived as having “sound practises” (Suchman, 1995: 580). 
Member states are located closer to the processes of the OECD, and are therefore more likely 
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to observe and understand the practises of the organisation and have the opportunity to view 
them as sound and legitimate. Non-member states on the other hand, observe the outcomes of 
the OECD without having an impression of how the practises of the organisation transpire in 
day to day life. However, as the previous chapter noted, the inclusion of non-member states 
into the process of reviewing the Model Tax Convention may have strengthened the 
procedural legitimacy of the Model Tax Convention as it brings non-OECD member states 
closer to the practises of the OECD.  The trends discovered above, point only to the fact that 
member-countries of the OECD are less likely to make reservations to the principle of 
exclusive taxation right of royalties to the state of residence, while non-member countries 
tend to make reservations to this principle. As literature has indicated, the perception amongst 
developing countries (non-OECD member states) that the Model Tax Convention benefits 
mainly developed countries (OECD member states) triggered the work of establishing the UN 
Model Double Taxation Convention (Surrey, 1980: 7). This indicates that non-OECD 
member states in fact were suspicious towards the OECD Model Tax Convention and them 
not being included in the process of developing the Model, which indicates weaker moral 
legitimacy for non-OECD states. Similarly, consequential legitimacy in which a country base 
its evaluations of an organisation upon its accomplishments, may be stronger for member-
states of the OECD than for non-member states due to their position as observing the 
accomplishments from a closer range. 
 
This chapter also found that original OECD members are more likely to adhere to the Model 
Tax Convention than OECD member-states which have become part of the OECD at a later 
stage. This may be explained in terms of moral legitimacy in the same manner as the 
difference between member states and non-member states. Original OECD members may feel 
that the OECD has proved itself to be an organisation which promotes social welfare in a 
satisfying manner over the years and thus choose not to make a reservation because the 
OECD knows what the “best thing to do” is from a pro-social perspective. 
  
Cognitive legitimacy is according to Suchman (1995: 582) achieved if an organisation's 
audience accept the organisation as necessary or inevitable. Cognitive legitimacy is 
recognised by a lack of explicit evaluations. The reservations that member-states and non-
member states make towards the Model Tax Convention is evidence that countries do not take 
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the OECD and their principles for taxation as a given. Rather than accepting the propositions 
of the OECD as comprehensible or take them for granted, states evaluate the propositions and 
the reservations can be seen as evidence of these evaluations having found place. In other 
words, the data material used in this chapter shows us that there is a low level of cognitive 
legitimacy. Although not all states involved in the process of evaluating the Model Tax 
Convention have chosen to make a reservation, the existence of reservations at all is evidence 
that states do not take the Model for granted, and there is no reason to believe that the states 
which have not reserved the right to tax royalties in the source state have refrained from 
calculating the proposition in the Model Tax Convention. Low cognitive legitimacy therefore 
cannot have the ability to explain variance in adherence.    
 
Self-interests was in Chapter 3 defined as a realist explanation for why states act as they do. 
The theory says that states will act in a manner which increases their own benefit. That means 
that states will adhere to the Model Tax Convention if it serves their self-interest. In addition, 
Suchman defines pragmatic legitimacy in the same manner, showing that self-interest is not 
simply a factor within the realist tradition.  
 
If self-interests explain adherence, countries with high levels of human development which 
are net capital-exporting countries are likely to adhere to the Model Tax Convention on the 
issue of where to tax royalties. This is because taxing royalties in the country of residence is 
most beneficial for high-income countries, and many argue that the Model Tax Convention in 
fact ensures that income is transferred from low-income countries to high-income countries, 
and ensures low taxation for multinational companies (Brooks, 2007:171 and Sheppard, 2012: 
467). The reasoning behind this argument is that high-income countries tend to be the ones 
who invent products, services and knowledge which gives rise to royalties, while low-income 
countries often provide the area of production. It is believed that the state which gives rise to 
the royalty has provided a set of services for which they should be compensated, such as 
research facilities, educated scientists and the necessary infrastructure. The OECD consists of 
high-income states, and taxation of royalties in the state of residence has become the principle 
within the OECD, which reflects the interests of its member states. However, when producing 
the goods and services with a royalty attached, low-income countries have to provide certain 
surroundings which are needed for production such as an educated labour force, a well-
73 
 
functioning market, the possibility of registering a company and the necessary infrastructure. 
From the reservations profile developed above, it seems like these countries also believe that 
they are entitled to some form of compensation through levying a tax on royalties also at 
source. Thus it becomes clear that the issue of benefit gives rise to reservations from the 
OECD principle of taxing royalties in the state of residence.  
 
In terms of economic reasoning for adhering to the OECD principle of taxing royalties in the 
state of residence, the lack of reservations amongst developed countries demonstrate that 
high-income, capital-exporting countries adhere to the OECD Model Tax Convention because 
of the self-interest they have in doing so. Similarly, the lack of adherence by low-income, net 
capital-importing countries signals that they do not view the OECD Model Tax Convention as 
beneficial. The explanation for adherence based upon the view that states act to defend their 
self-interests thus seems to be relevant for the level of adherence. 
 
 Why do states adhere to the Model Tax 5.7
Convention? 
After having accounted for the reservations made by states, identified some general trends and 
analysed these in terms of the relevant independent variables, it is desirable to return to the 
research question and look at the implications the analysis has for answering the question. 
The second research question asked “Why do countries from all over the world adhere to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention and its principle of exclusive right to tax royalties in states of 
residence?” This chapter has found that in fact states from all over the world do not 
necessarily adhere to the principle advocated in the Model Tax Convention. Rather, states 
which are members of the OECD seem to adhere to a certain degree, while non-member states 
are less likely to adhere. Only two countries outside the OECD with the opportunity to share 
their positions on the Model Tax Convention have chosen not to make a reservation towards 
the proposition of exclusive taxation rights to the states of residence. Adherence is thus lower 
than expected at the outset, but the question of why is still relevant; analysing what determines 
the level of adherence is the essence of answering the research question.  
74 
 
 
The analysis in this chapter has found that there is a low level of cognitive legitimacy 
observed among states, because states do make reservations. Not all states have reserved the 
right to tax royalties in the source state, but the fact that a large number of the countries 
involved in the process have made reservations is evidence that states do contemplate the 
content of the Model Tax Convention. It is unlikely that states without reservations have not 
also contemplated the content of the Model Tax Convention which also signals low cognitive 
legitimacy even if they end up without reservations. The empirical evidence thus shows that 
cognitive legitimacy is low regardless of the outcome on the dependent variable and does not 
explain variance in adherence. Cognitive legitimacy is, on the basis for this reasoning, ruled 
out as an explanation for adherence. 
 
Moral legitimacy seems to have some ability to explain adherence to the Model Tax 
Convention. Member-states have a closer proximity to the OECD and may perceive the 
organisation as pro-social to a larger degree than non-member states. The same principle may 
apply for original members of the OECD who are more likely to adhere to the Model Tax 
Convention because they have had the opportunity to observe the work of the OECD for a 
longer period of time. The previous chapter identified the inclusion of non-member states into 
the process of evaluating the Model Tax Convention as a source for higher moral procedural 
legitimacy. However this chapter has demonstrated that such inclusion does not seem to 
increase adherence, which weakens the trend of increased moral legitimacy. Lastly, it has 
been observed that the UN Model was constructed due to non-member states of the OECD 
perceiving the OECD Model as not pro-social from their point of view. Summarised, moral 
legitimacy is low amongst non-member states, but slightly higher among members of the 
OECD and particularly those states which were members from the start of the organisation's 
life. As adherence follows the same pattern; low adherence from non-member states, higher 
for member-states particularly original OECD members, moral legitimacy accounts for some 
variation in adherence.  
 
The analysis also established that self-interests seem to account for variation in adherence, as 
member-states which are more likely to adhere also benefit the most from the policies 
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advocated in the Model Tax Convention. Capital-exporting states with a high level of 
development benefit the most from taxing royalties exclusively in the state of residence, and 
according to theory on pragmatic legitimacy and realist notions of states as maximisers of 
gains, these states should adhere to the Model Tax Convention, while the opposite should be 
true for capital-importing states with low levels of development. These theoretical predictions 
correspond to the patterns in adherence, and self-interests also help explain adherence.     
 
The question at hand at this point is which explanation explains adherence the best; moral 
legitimacy or self-interests? The explanation of moral legitimacy rests solely upon the 
assumption that states which have a closer proximity to the OECD as an organisation have a 
better likelihood of perceiving the organisation as morally sound and pro-social. However, no 
direct evidence that states close to the OECD have this perception can be found in the data 
material at hand. Evidence in favour of the self-interest variable however, is based upon 
evaluations of the capital-exporting capabilities of states and the concrete level of human 
development. The interview at the Norwegian Ministry of Finance revealed that: “It is in our 
interests not to have high rates of source taxation on royalties in our taxation treaties. We will 
in taxation treaties reduce the taxation rates [source rates; author's note] on royalties as a 
result of other countries' interests” (Appendix 2, 2014 [interview]). This statement further 
strengthens the evidence of self-interests as the dominant explanatory factor for adherence to 
the Model Tax Convention. Norway as a capital-exporting country with very high levels of 
human development and as an OECD member has an interest in adhering to the principle of 
exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence. The opposite will be true for capital-
importing states with low levels of human development, often countries outside of OECD 
membership.  
 
The most viable explanation for variance in adherence is the independent variable of self-
interests. States adhere to the Model Tax Convention and the principle of exclusive taxation 
rights to the state of residence if they benefit from doing so. Likewise, states reserve 
themselves from this principle in cases where they do not benefit. Moral legitimacy may also 
account for some variation in adherence, but without further evidence for moral legitimacy, it 
is not possible to conclude that moral legitimacy is more important than self-interests in 
explaining adherence.  
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 Summary 5.8
This chapter has looked at the reservations countries have made towards Article 12 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. By examining the parts of the OECD document which 
outlines the positions and reservations of both member countries and non-member countries 
of the OECD, a reservation profile has been made which can be viewed in tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
Based upon these observations, some general trends in the patterns of reservations and 
adherence have been explored. There is a clear trend which signals that OECD member 
countries are more likely to have a higher level of adherence to the convention than non-
member countries. Furthermore, countries with high human development, which are net 
capital-exporters and which have been members of the OECD from the beginning of the 
organisation's life, tend to adhere to the Model Tax Convention. These trends may be 
explained in terms of the independent variables this thesis have identified, and it has been 
shown that cognitive legitimacy is not relevant in explaining the trends, precisely because 
states issue reservations towards the policies in the Model Tax Convention. Moral legitimacy 
has some explanatory power with regards to explaining the differences between member 
states and non-member states, as well as explaining the difference in adherence within 
member states to the OECD. However, the most important factor of explanation seems to be 
the variable of self-interest, which shows that the assumption that states act to maximise their 
own benefit is the single most important factor to account for the variance in adherence to the 
Model Tax Convention. In order to find out how countries in fact act when concluding 
bilateral taxation treaties, some treaties will be considered in the next chapter. As the bilateral 
taxation treaties are legally binding and are the arena where the positions and preferences of 
the countries can be expressed in reality, these treaties hold a lot of valuable information 
within them which can help continue understand why states adhere to the Model Tax 
Convention.  
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6 Analysis of Bilateral Taxation 
Treaties 
 
 Introduction  6.1
The aim of this chapter is to continue to find coherent ways to answer the second part of the 
research question regarding why countries adhere to the Model Tax Convention. The previous 
chapter focused on the reservations that countries have made towards the principle of 
exclusive taxation rights of royalties to the state of residence, using reservations as indicators 
for adherence and the aim was to explain the underlying reasons for reservations through the 
independent variables of legitimacy and self-interest. However, in order to understand how 
reservations are taken into account in the practical use of the Model Tax Convention, this 
chapter will look at bilateral taxation treaties. While the Model Tax Convention and the 
reservations therein are not legally binding, the taxation treaties that countries agree upon are. 
Bilateral taxation treaties are the main place in which reservations and policy-preferences 
become evident. It is in the bilateral taxation treaties we can find information about how 
different interests and preferences are expressed and how the reservations are treated. It is 
therefore within the taxation treaties that evidence can be found on adherence in practical 
terms. So while the previous chapter dealt with the perception of the Model Tax Convention, 
this chapter will turn to its actual influence. The aim is however the same as in the previous 
chapter, namely to investigate why, with respect to the independent variables, states adhere to 
the Model Tax Convention. The causal relationship is thus the same as in chapter 5, and 
although the source of information is different, causal comparability is still strong.   
 
The first part of this chapter will outline the selection of treaties to consider and the content of 
these with regards to adherence to the Model Tax Convention. Based upon the findings of 
chapter 5 it is expected that taxation treaties where at least one of the parties to the treaty is 
not a member of the OECD, the proposition of taxing royalties in the state of residence will 
not be adhered to. The second part of this chapter will turn to analysis of the pattern of 
adherence. Using moral legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy, self-interests and negotiation power 
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as potential explanations for variance in adherence, I will try to determine which variable has 
the most power of explanation for the outcome of taxation treaties.  
 
 Bilateral Taxation Treaties 6.2
The purpose of OECD Model Tax Convention is to provide a standard for how to design and 
conclude bilateral taxation treaties. As mentioned, the Model in itself is not a legally binding 
document, but is meant to be used as a guide for countries wishing to negotiate taxation 
treaties with other countries. The taxation treaties in turn are legally binding for the signatory 
states, and have repercussions for citizens and companies wishing to conduct economic 
activity between the two states. The bilateral taxation treaties are the ultimate outcome of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, and provide the best basis to understand how countries 
respond to the principles laid out in the Model Tax Convention. It is therefore natural to look 
at some examples of bilateral taxation treaties and how these respect the provisions of the 
Model Tax Convention in light of the reservations that have been made regarding how to tax 
royalties.  
 
However, as more than 3000 bilateral taxation treaties exist today which are based upon the 
OECD Model Tax Convention (Bennett and Owens, 2008) it is impossible to carefully 
examine the extent to which all of these adhere to the OECD Model Tax Convention. Rather, 
a selection has to be made in order to consider a few of the existing treaties. While the 
previous chapter used the entire population as a source of data, this part of the analysis will 
have to select a smaller sample to consider. I have categorised those countries which have 
explicitly been involved in the process of commenting and providing positions on the OECD 
Model Tax Convention. All OECD member-countries are included in the categorising, as well 
as all non-members who are mentioned in the OECD document, under the section “Non-
OECD Economies’ Positions on the OECD Model Tax Convention” (OECD, 2012: P). 
Chapter 5 gave rise to tables 5.1 and 5.2 where reservations are indicated for member and 
non-member states of the OECD. These are used here to provide the basis for the four 
categories of states in table 6.1. The first category of states consists of member states of the 
OECD which have not reserved themselves from taxing royalties in the state of residence. In 
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other words, they adhere to the OECD principle. The second category is countries which are 
members of the OECD but have reserved the right to tax royalties at source, and therefore do 
not adhere to the OECD principle. The same division has been made for states which are not 
members of the OECD, and while the third category consists of states without reservations, 
the fourth category contains those countries which have reserved the right to tax royalties at 
source. Summarised, this makes four distinct categories of countries; OECD member-states 
with no reservation, OECD member-states with a reservation, non-member states with no 
reservation and non-member states with a reservation.  
 
In order to consider a variety of bilateral taxation treaties which may better represent the 
wider population of treaties, I will consider treaties from various categories. Choices of which 
treaties to consider have been made primarily based upon the categorising of countries, and 
then secondly based upon convenience and accessibility of taxation treaties, as expanded 
upon below.  
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 Selection of Treaties 6.3
This section will outline which treaties are to be analysed in this chapter and the reasoning 
behind the selection. The reservation profile developed in Chapter 5 is the basis for the 
categories in table 6.1. Categorising countries in this manner is done so that the selected 
sample of bilateral taxation treaties to be analysed is diverse and therefore may be 
representable for the wider population of taxation treaties. Countries which are members of 
the OECD, not members of the OECD, and those which have made reservations and have not 
made reservations were chosen, in order to get an impression of how each category of states 
respond to the existence of the Model Tax Convention in reality. Using different types of 
countries will also allow the dependent variable to vary, thus increasing variation in the 
sample. The posed research question asks why countries from all over the world adhere to the 
Convention, and in order to answer this question, it is important to actually consider taxation 
Categories:
OECD, no reservation OECD, reservation Non-OECD, no reservation Non-OECD, reservation
Austria Australia India Albania
Belgium Chile United Arab Emirates Argentina
Canada Korea Armenia
Czech Republic Mexico Belarus
Denmark New Zealand Brazil
Estonia Poland Bulgaria
Finland Portugal Croatia
France Slovak Republic DR Congo
Germany Slovenia Gabon
Greece Turkey Hong Kong, China
Hungary Indonesia
Iceland Ivory Coast
Ireland Kazakhstan
Israel Latvia
Italy Lithuania
Japan Malaysia 
Luxembourg Morocco
Netherlands People's Republic of China
Norway Philippines
Spain Romania
Sweden Russia
Switzerland Serbia
United Kingdom South Africa
United States Thailand
Tunisia
Ukraine
Vietnam 
Table 6.1: Categories of states 
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treaties including countries from all over the world with different interests, demands and 
preferences.  
 
It is desirable to start with a country in the first category where we find OECD member-states 
without reservations. Twenty-four (24) countries fall under this category, so in order to select 
one, accessibility will be emphasised. Norway has not made any reservations towards the 
Article whatsoever, and agrees with the OECD Commentaries without insisting on adding or 
retracting anything. Norway, therefore, can be considered as a textbook example of an 
OECD-member state belonging to the first category. In addition, the accessibility of bilateral 
taxation agreements varies significantly depending on the parties to the agreements and the 
transparency of official documents in those countries. Bilateral taxation treaties tend to be 
signed in a maximum of two languages; the official languages of the two countries which are 
party to the agreement, which makes it difficult to access and understand the content of any 
given agreement. As I have an obvious close proximity to the Norwegian government and due 
to the accessibility and language understanding of those treaties, I have chosen to use 
Norwegian double taxation treaties as a starting point for the analysis of bilateral treaties.  
 
Norway is a member of the OECD which has not reserved itself from the principle of taxing 
royalties exclusively in the state of residence, which, based upon the findings of the previous 
chapters is likely to be because of the benefits that Norway acquires from following the 
OECD proposition. As a high-income, capital-exporting country with a very high level of 
human development and an original member of the OECD, Norway's adherence to the Model 
Tax Convention is expected to be high.  
 
First, it is desirable to look at a taxation treaty that Norway has signed with another OECD-
member country which is also has not made a reservation to the Model Tax Convention, is 
localised in the same category, and is fairly similar to Norway. A Nordic country is the most 
obvious example of a country with major political, cultural, ethnic and, most importantly in 
this case, economic similarities to Norway. It is also reasonable to assume that the negotiation 
process between the Nordic countries would be characterised by similar negotiation strength. 
The Nordic countries have in fact negotiated a taxation agreement which is multilateral rather 
than bilateral, where Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Finland and the Faroe Islands are 
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the parties to one common agreement. Neither Sweden, Denmark, Finland nor Iceland has 
made reservations to Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, and none of the 
countries has expressed disagreement with the OECD Commentaries. The Faroe Islands is not 
an OECD-member state, and is also not included in the non-members that have commented 
and/or made reservations from the Convention. However, the reason for its inclusion to the 
agreement is that the Faroe Island has its own tax jurisdiction, and has close cultural and 
economic ties to the remaining parties of the agreement (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
1996). There is no reason to believe that the inclusion of the Faroe Islands has had much 
impact on the actual content of the agreement text, and the agreement can therefore be seen as 
a double taxation treaty between OECD-member states with no reservation to the content or 
applicability of the OECD Model Tax Convention.  
 
Second, I want to look at another OECD-member state, but one which has reserved the right 
to tax royalties as source, and therefore differ in the level of adherence to the OECD Model 
Tax Convention. There are ten states in the second category which have reserved themselves 
from paragraph 1 of Article 12, and thus do not agree with the OECD provision that royalties 
should not be taxed in the source country. Norway has a double taxation agreement with all of 
these ten countries. Five of the countries with full reservations to Article 12 are located in 
Europe, and out of the remaining countries, four have been classified as having a very high 
level of development according to the 2013 Human Development Index (UNDP, 2013:152). 
My wish is to select a bilateral taxation agreement with an OECD-member country which 
differs from Norway with regards to geography, cultural ties and economic activity, in order 
to ensure variation in the sample. This will strengthen representativeness which was discussed 
in section 3.4 of Chapter 3. Arriving at a sample which represents a more diverse selection 
will strengthen the external validity and possibility to generalise to the population as a whole. 
Using the Human Development Index adjusted for inequality is one way to distinguish the 
level of economic and human development. Based upon this index I find that the country 
which differs the most from Norway in this group in terms of geography (outside of Europe), 
and in terms of development, is Mexico. Mexico is classified in a different category of human 
development than Norway, and is also located on a different continent. When considering a 
double taxation agreement between OECD-member states which have fully reserved themself 
83 
 
from the provision of not taxing royalties at source, I will therefore look at the agreement 
between Norway and Mexico.  
 
The third category of states to consider is non-OECD member states without reservations to 
Article 12, paragraph 1. Among the 29 non-member states which are reflected in the 2010 
version of the OECD Model Tax Convention
2
, only two countries have not reserved the right 
to tax royalties at source. These two countries are the United Arab Emirates and India. Ideally 
I would prefer to look at the case of the United Arab Emirates as it is the only country which 
has not made any reservations to Article 12, and which also adheres to the OECD 
Commentaries. However, Norway does not have a double taxation treaty with the United 
Arab Emirates, so the possibility of examining this type of treaty is not available. Norway 
does however have a taxation treaty with India, which is the agreement I will consider in this 
category. It must however be noted that India has made the reservation to continue to tax 
royalties from technical service at source. India furthermore disagrees with a number of the 
OECD Commentaries and is the country with the single most interference, in the sense that it 
disagrees with many of the definitions provided by the Commentaries (OECD, 2012: P (12)-4 
– P (12)-5).  
 
Lastly, the category of non-OECD member states which have reserved themselves from 
Article 12, Paragraph 1 is to be considered. Twenty-seven (27) countries have opted to fully 
reserve the right to continue to tax royalties at source. These countries represent a varied 
collection of countries in terms of economic and human development, as well as geographic 
location. However, as the other treaties considered thus far have been placed in the categories 
of very high, high and medium development, according to the Human Development Index, it 
would be interesting to look at a case of an agreement between a very highly developed 
country and a country with low human development. These countries would likely differ with 
regards to interests and capabilities, and will therefore provide a case worth analysing. 
Considering the non-OECD member countries with reservations to the Article, only two 
countries experience low human development. These are The Democratic Republic of Congo 
                                                 
2 In the 2010 version of the OECD Model Tax Convention 31 non-member countries have given inputs. 
However, as Israel and Estonia became OECD members later in 2010, their positions are considered along 
with the rest of the member countries for the purpose of this study.  
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and the Ivory Coast. As Norway does not have a double taxation agreement with The DRC, 
the agreement which will be considered in this category is the one between Norway and the 
Ivory Coast.   
 
Thus far thus section has outlined the reasoning for choosing the agreements that Norway has 
conducted with each the four categories of countries represented in table 6.1. Ideally it would 
then be possible to use the same countries to conduct analysis of the agreements with the 
remaining combinations of countries. However, this becomes difficult as not all countries 
have the relevant taxation agreements with each other. The rest of this section will briefly 
outline the remaining treaties which will be analysed.  
 
First, I would like to consider an agreement between an OECD-member state with 
reservations, and an OECD non-member without reservations. Here, it is possible to use the 
same countries as above, because India and Mexico have a double taxation treaty with each 
other which will be considered.  
 
Second, as an OECD non-member state without full reservations India does not have an 
agreement with the Ivory Coast. In fact, the Ivory Coast has remarkably few double taxation 
agreements, only 10 agreements in total (UNCTAD, 2011: 1). However, India does have an 
agreement with Vietnam, which also is an OECD non-member state with full reservations to 
Article 12, paragraph 1. Therefore, this agreement between India and Vietnam will be 
considered. 
 
Third, in considering the combination of an OECD-member state with reservations and an 
OECD non-member with reservations, it is not possible to use the same countries because 
again, the Ivory Coast does not have any agreements which fall within this category. 
However, using the same country from above, Vietnam does have an agreement with an 
OECD-member which has fully reserved itself from Paragraph 1 of Article 12, namely 
Australia. This agreement will be considered.  
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The seven bilateral taxation treaties which will be considered have now been presented. The 
selection of treaties to be analysed in greater detail have been based upon the categories which 
were developed in the previous chapter on reservations, availability and accessibility of 
taxation treaties, as well as the ability to understand the content of these agreement texts. The 
framework for developing categories of states was adopted from the reservation picture from 
Chapter 5 and allows for variation within the sample, which will strengthen the 
representativeness of the analysis and the possibility of generalising results. In addition, the 
diversification of the sample will allow for a better ability to answer the research question, 
which addresses why countries from all over the world adhere to the Model Tax Convention's 
principle of taxing royalties in the state of residence. Within the phrasing “all over the world” 
lies an intention of discovering why countries with and without influence over the content of 
the Model Tax Convention, and with different interests, demands and preferences for taxation 
standards, choose or do not choose to adhere to the propositions of the OECD. The dyads of 
countries which will be analysed below are: Norway-Nordic countries, Norway-Mexico, 
Norway-India, Norway-Ivory Coast, India-Mexico, India-Vietnam and Vietnam-Australia. I 
now turn to examining these bilateral taxation treaties in greater detail.   
 
 Analysis of Treaties 6.4
This section will look at the selected bilateral agreements outlined above. The aim of this 
analysis is to determine to which degree bilateral taxation agreements between various 
categories of countries follow the recommendations that the OECD Model Tax Convention 
provides, in other words; the level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention. Section 6.6 
and 6.7 will turn to analysing the explanations behind adherence by looking at the 
independent variables and determine whether they have the power to explain adherence to the 
Model Tax Convention.  
 
The analysis will look mainly at the first paragraph which states whether the agreements 
adhere to the OECD principle of taxing royalties in the state of residence. It is Paragraph 1 of 
Article 12 which outlines the OECD principle of exclusive taxation rights of royalties to the 
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state of residence, which is of particular importance to answer the research question. In order 
to consider the issue of taxation of royalties in its context, and to get a more comprehensive 
view of adherence, the remaining aspects of Article 12 will be briefly considered.  
 
6.4.1 Bilateral Taxation Treaty between Norway and the Nordic 
countries 
None of the Nordic Countries have made any reservations towards Article 12 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention whatsoever. Neither have any of the countries made any comments or 
explicit positions on the OECD Commentaries of the Convention text. The taxation treaty is 
therefore expected to follow the propositions outlined by the OECD, and adhere to the 
principle of taxing royalties in the state of residence only.  
 
Article 12 of the agreement is a direct copy of the OECD Model Tax Convention. No words 
or principles have been changed, but paragraph 2 of the Model Tax Convention, which 
defines the term royalties was excluded from the agreement text in 2008 (Norwegian Ministry 
of Finance, 2008). There is no reason to believe that this exclusion was done for any other 
reason than confirming that there is consensus on the definition of royalties. After the 
amendments made to the agreement in 2008, a list of justifications and explanations of 
changes were made, and the exclusion of paragraph 2 is not included in this list, confirming 
that the removal of this paragraph was trivial.  
 
The double taxation agreement is thus in complete unison with the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. The treaty follows the expectations in that no country had made reservations so 
they were expected to adhere to the Model Tax Convention. The treaty is thus aligned with 
expectations which strengthen the model.    
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6.4.2 Bilateral Taxation Treaty between Norway and Mexico 
While Norway is a member of the OECD with no reservation to the principle of taxing 
royalties in the state of residence, Mexico is also a member of the OECD but has reserved the 
right to tax royalties in the source country. As the OECD itself encourages countries to 
respect reservations made, it is expected that the taxation treaty between these two states will 
not adhere to the Model Tax Convention, but rather allow for taxation of royalties in the 
source state.  
 
The content of Article 12 is closely related to the OECD Model Tax Convention, and the first 
paragraph is nearly the same as the OECD proposition, stating that royalties may be taxed in 
the state of residence. However, a second paragraph is added which determines that the 
royalty can also be taxed in the source country, as long as the taxation of the royalty does not 
exceed 10% of the royalty's gross value.  
 
The Article otherwise follows the OECD Model Tax Convention closely, adhering to the 
same definition of what constitutes a royalty. A few minor additions are included in the 
double taxation agreement to define which circumstances must be fulfilled in order to claim 
that a royalty derives from any given country. However, these are minor additions which only 
function as clarifications of the Article text, and are for the most part taken from the OECD 
Commentaries. The exception to this, is paragraph 7 which opens up for bilateral negotiations 
between the tax authorities in relation to individual cases, and paragraph 8 which opens up for 
negotiations in cases where the royalty may be suspected to exceed the arm-length principle 
i.e. the price of the royalty exceed the marked value and thus initiate suspicions of tax 
avoidance. In these cases, tax authorities in both states should consult on the issue.  
 
Article 12 of the double taxation agreement between Norway and Mexico thus adheres to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention to a certain extent. The overarching principle is that royalties 
are to be taxed in the state of residence, but with an extra addendum added which clearly 
opens up for limited royalty taxation in the source state. A 10% tax can be deducted in the 
source country on income from royalties. Taxation rates on royalties usually mirror corporate 
taxation rates which were at a global average of 24% in 2013 (KPMG, 2014), meaning states 
of residence has the opportunity to tax slightly more than the source country (14% if the 
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global average is used as an indicator). As Norway has not used the opportunity to reserve 
itself from this paragraph in the OECD Model Tax Convention, while Mexico has reserved 
itself, it is likely that paragraph 2 has been added at the request of Mexico. It is reasonable to 
assume that bilateral negotiations have resulted in the 10% ceiling on royalty taxation at 
source as a compromise.  
 
Mexico's reservation was therefore respected by Norway in these negotiations and, as 
expected, the taxation treaty does not adhere to the Model Tax Convention. 
 
6.4.3 Bilateral Taxation Treaty between Norway and India 
India is one of two countries which fall into the category of non-OECD members which have 
opted not to fully reserve themselves from Article 12, paragraph 1. However, as can be seen 
in table 5.2, India is the only country who has made a limited reservation to this paragraph. 
Examining the nature of this reservation, it states that “India reserves the right to: tax royalties 
and fees for technical service at source (...)” (OECD, 2012: P (12)-1). Based upon the lack of 
reservations towards taxing royalties in the state of residence, it is expected that the taxation 
treaty will adhere to the Model Tax Convention. However, if the smaller reservation is 
followed, one may expect that the taxation treaty will allow for royalties and fees for technical 
services to be taxed in the source country.   
 
The first paragraph of the taxation treaty follows the first paragraph of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, and states that royalties should be taxed in the state of residence. However, 
paragraph 2 provides an addition that directly reflects the reservation made by India, and 
states that royalties or fees from technical service can also be taxed in the source country, as 
long as the source taxation does not exceed 10% of the gross value of the royalty payment 
(Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2011: 7).  
 
The remaining paragraphs of Article 12 in the agreement is copied from the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, but with a couple of added paragraphs which explicitly defines and outlines 
the conditions for taxing royalties and fees for technical service in the source country.  
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It can be deduced that Norway has in these negotiations accepted India's reservation against 
taxing royalties and fees for technical service in the state of residence, and accepted that this 
type of royalty also be taxed in the source country. During the negotiations a compromise has 
been made that outlines that source taxation of royalties and fees for technical service be 
limited to 10%. The position put forward in the OECD document is reflected almost word for 
word in this bilateral agreement. The taxation treaty therefore adheres to taxing royalties in 
the state of residence, but scores slightly lower on the adherence variable due to the 
exemption for technical fees and royalties.  
 
6.4.4 Bilateral Taxation Treaty between Norway and the Ivory Coast 
The Ivory Coast has fully reserved itself from paragraph 1 of Article 12 in the OECD Model 
Tax Convention. However, the Ivory Coast only reserved itself from this particular paragraph 
in 2003 (OECD, 2012: P (12)-6), and the bilateral double taxation agreement between 
Norway and the Ivory Coast was signed in 1978, and has not been updated since. Since 
neither Norway nor the Ivory Coast had made any reservation towards taxing royalties in the 
state of residence in 1978, it is expected that the taxation treaty will adhere to the Model Tax 
Convention.  
 
The first sentence of paragraph 1 in Article 12 in the bilateral agreement states that royalties 
may be taxed in the state of residence. However, paragraph 1 continues to outline important 
exceptions to this, by determining that all royalties related to the use of any natural resources 
in the source country should only be taxed in this source country.  
 
Furthermore, paragraph 2 expands on the general rule of the taxation of royalties in the state 
of residence, by noting that royalties can in fact also be taxed in the source country, but this 
taxation is capped at 16% of the gross value of the royalty. Thus, the taxation of royalties is in 
practical terms split between the source country and the country of residence. The average 
global taxation rate is around 24% percent (KPMG, 2014) and if this is any indicator, the 
source country actually has the opportunity to collect the largest share of taxation income. 
The rest of the Article follows the definitions and terms laid out by the OECD Model Tax 
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Convention, with only one additional paragraph which specifies how to define the country of 
residence and the source country.  
 
Even though the Ivory Coast did not reserve itself from the OECD principle of taxing 
royalties in the country of residence before 2003, the bilateral agreement nevertheless seems 
to reflect the view that royalties should also be taxable in the source country. There are not 
exclusive taxation rights on royalties in neither the source nor the residence country, but 
sharing this right seems to reflect a compromise between the OECD perspective and the view 
voiced by many developing countries that source countries should be allowed to tax income 
from royalties.   
 
The taxation treaty between Norway and the Ivory Coast thus break with expectations as they 
presented themselves in 1978, but follow current expectations because the Ivory Coast has 
made a reservation to tax royalties at source after the taxation treaty was concluded. 
Adherence to the Model Tax Convention is therefore low.  
 
Section 6.4.5 to 6.4.7 will now turn to taxation treaties concluded without a typical OECD 
member state, which in the cases above has been Norway.  
 
6.4.5 Bilateral Taxation Treaty between India and Mexico 
As already stated, India is one out of only two non-OECD countries that has not fully 
reserved itself from Paragraph 1 of Article 12 in the OECD Model Tax Convention. However, 
it has insisted on including fees for technical service in the definition of royalties, and 
reserved the right to tax these fees in the source country. Mexico has fully reserved itself from 
the Paragraph in question. Expectations are that this bilateral taxation treaty will have a low 
level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention despite the fact that only one party has fully 
reserved the right to tax royalties at source.  
 
The first Paragraph of the bilateral agreement states that both royalties and fees for technical 
service are to be taxed in the state of residence, which is consistent with the OECD Model 
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Tax Convention. However, the second Paragraph opens up for taxation in the source country 
of royalties and fees for technical service, but with a cap on 10% taxation. Thus, the 
agreement provides the basis for sharing taxation rights for royalties and fees for technical 
service.  
 
Furthermore, Mexico, which has fully reserved the right to tax royalties at source, has given 
up this principle in the agreement with India. Mexico has accepted India's proposition to tax 
royalties and fees for technical service only at source, while other royalties are to be taxed in 
the state of residence only which is in accordance with the Model Tax Convention.  
 
Otherwise, the Article in the bilateral agreement follows the OECD Model Tax Convention, 
but it provides some additional paragraphs which define the terms for taxing fees for technical 
service. These paragraphs follow the same terms that the OECD Model Tax Convention 
provides for taxing royalties. Adherence to the Model Tax Convention is therefore relatively 
low, but not as low as expected as it is only royalties and fees for technical service that are to 
be taxed in the source state.   
 
6.4.6 Bilateral Taxation Treaty between India and Vietnam 
India has not fully reserved the right to tax royalties at source, but has limited this reservation 
to only regard royalties and fees for technical service. Vietnam, on the other hand, has fully 
reserved itself from the OECD principle of exclusive taxation rights of royalties to the state of 
residence. Based upon these preferences, it is expected that the taxation treaty between these 
two countries will not adhere to the Model Tax Convention. 
 
Although India has insisted on including fees for technical service in all of the preceding 
bilateral taxation agreements, this is not explicitly mentioned in the agreement between India 
and Vietnam. The first Paragraph of Article 12 in the bilateral taxation agreement between 
India and Vietnam gives the state of residence the right to tax royalties. However, the second 
paragraph states that also the source country is entitled to tax royalties with up to 10 %.  
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The remaining parts of Article 12 of the agreement are consistent with the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, and follow the same definitions of royalties as the OECD provides. The only 
addition to the agreement is a paragraph which defines what constitutes a source country and 
what defines a country of residence.   
 
It is curious that this particular agreement made by India does not include any particular 
mention of fees for technical service, as do other agreements made by India considered here. 
Especially because this bilateral agreement does not differentiate itself in terms of the date of 
signing. The other agreements that India has signed with Norway and Mexico were concluded 
in 2011 and 1961 respectively, while the agreement with Vietnam was concluded in 1995. In 
light of this, there is no reason to believe that India's preferences have changed over time with 
regards to including fees for technical service into the agreement, but rather it may have 
something to do with the party of the agreement. Perhaps, this anomaly is related to Vietnam 
being a country with a level of development which differs from the other bilateral agreements 
considered here. Otherwise, it may be that India considers the inclusion of a 10% tax on 
royalties at source to satisfy their position. It may do so in terms of royalties for technical 
service, but this does not change the fact that the agreement does not address the issue of 
taxing fees for technical service.   
 
The agreement provides the opportunity for shared taxation between the two states, as long as 
the tax at source does not exceed 10%. The expectation of non-adherence is thus not 
completely fulfilled, but the level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention is low.  
 
6.4.7 Bilateral Taxation Treaty between Vietnam and Australia 
Both Australia as an OECD-member and Vietnam as a non-OECD member have fully 
reserved themselves from Paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
This means that none of the countries should be expected to adhere to the principle of taxing 
royalties in the state of residence. 
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However, the first paragraph of Article 12 in the bilateral taxation agreement does state that 
royalties may be taxed in the state of residence. But as have been observed in previous 
taxation treaties, the second paragraph states that royalties may also be taxable in the source 
country, as long as the tax does not exceed 10% and thus provides the basis for shared 
taxation of royalties.  
 
The bilateral agreement also expands the definition of royalties compared with the definition 
that the OECD provides in the Model Tax Convention. But it must be noted that the extended 
definition does not interfere with the OECD's definition because it merely incorporates the 
extended definitions outlined in the OECD Commentaries into the actual agreement text. 
Thus, the agreement is consistent with the OECD Model Tax Convention with regards to the 
remaining parts of Article 12.  
 
As with the taxation treaty between India and Vietnam, this taxation treaty between Vietnam 
and Australia has a low level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention. Adherence is 
however not as low as one might have expected given that both countries have reserved the 
right to tax royalties at source.  
 
 General trends 6.5
With regards to the bilateral taxation treaties considered, in general there seems to be a trend 
towards not following the OECD Model Tax Convention, Article 12, Paragraph 1 with 
regards to taxing royalties in the state of residence only. Only the agreement between the 
Nordic countries fully adheres to the OECD Model Tax Convention, and states that royalties 
are to be taxed only in the state of residence. All other bilateral agreements have included a 
similar paragraph into the agreement. However, while the OECD Model Tax Convention use 
the phrasing: “shall be taxable only in that other State” (OECD, 2012: M-34), all the 
agreements (excluding the one between Norway and the Nordic countries) use the phrasing: 
“may be taxed in that other State”. That other State, in both cases refers to the country of 
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residence. The bilateral agreements thus use a weaker language than do the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, and rather follow the UN Model Convention which also uses the word may (UN, 
2011: 18). Furthermore, all the bilateral agreements include a second paragraph which states 
that royalties may also be taxed in the source country. The majority of the bilateral taxation 
treaties cap the taxation of royalties at source at 10%. The exceptions to this cap at 10% are 
the agreement between Norway and the Nordic countries, and the agreement between Norway 
and the Ivory Coast. The agreement between Norway and the Ivory Coast cap taxation of 
royalties at source to 16% for most royalties, and provide exclusive royalty taxation rights at 
source for royalties related to natural resources. Shared rights to taxation of royalties thus 
seem to be the main trend in bilateral taxation agreements. In other words, the main 
observation is a low level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention.  
 
It is interesting to note that this general trend of using a 10% cap on taxation of royalties at 
source seems to be a trend derived from an unofficial consensus amongst the states considered 
here. The OECD Model Tax Convention does not recommend taxation of royalties at source 
whatsoever, while the UN Model Convention does recommend shared taxation of royalties. 
However, the UN Model Convention does not provide a recommendation of capping this tax 
at 10%, but rather leaves the level of taxation to be determined by the countries in 
negotiations.  
 
In general, non-OECD members tend to reserve themselves from exclusive taxation rights on 
royalties in the state of residence as found in Chapter 5. This is reflected in the findings from 
the selected bilateral agreements where the OECD principle of exclusive taxation rights in the 
country of residence is adhered to only between OECD countries that have not made any 
reservations to Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The remaining bilateral 
taxation agreements have a low level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention, and rather 
follow the principle of shared taxation rights on profits arising from royalty payments. 
 
So far this chapter has focused on the selection of the sample for analysis and the level of 
adherence observed in the bilateral taxation treaties in this sample. It has been observed that 
adherence to the Model Tax Convention is relatively low as a general trend. But countries do 
not divert completely from the propositions of the OECD in the sense that countries do adhere 
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to having some taxation of royalties in the state of residence, although not exclusively as the 
OECD recommends. The remaining part of the chapter will turn to the independent variables 
and try to answer the research question by finding the underlying reasons for the trends of 
adherence discovered above. What will be analysed in the sections to follow will be the 
explanation behind the low level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention by using the 
independent variables of this research project.  
 
 Explaining Adherence 6.6
The theoretical background of moral and cognitive legitimacy, self-interests and negotiation 
power was outlined in detail in chapter two, and is the basis for the independent variables in 
this thesis. This section will discuss which variables provide viable explanations for 
adherence to the Model Tax Convention. Because the taxation treaty is a product of the 
relationship between the states in question, no definite conclusions can be drawn upon the 
perceptions of legitimacy of each state individually from these treaties. The states have 
discussed, compromised and finally agreed upon certain policies. This discussion will 
therefore focus on the taxation treaties themselves, as well as how states seem to act in 
relation to their reservations investigated in the previous chapter. These reservations express 
the opinion of individual states towards the OECD principle of exclusive taxation rights to the 
state of residence and here I discuss how these preferences are affected and acted upon in 
taxation treaties. As in the previous empirical chapters, the discussions below in this section 
and the next will justify the conclusions made in order to increase the transparency in this 
thesis, in line with Gerring's (2005) criteria for good research.  
 
Moral legitimacy represents calculations made by countries on whether the OECD and its 
policies represent the “right thing to do.” Chapter 5 found evidence to support the claim that 
moral legitimacy has some power to explain why states issue reservations to the Model Tax 
Convention.  
 
It is difficult to gather evidence of moral considerations directly from the taxation treaties 
because these naturally do not contain reflections of the morality of OECD's principles. 
However, evidence of moral legitimacy in the case of bilateral taxation treaties could be 
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indicated through negotiating parties giving special rights or concessions to states which are 
considered less developed than oneself. One example of moral legitimacy would be if 
countries rewarded source countries with a variation in the percentage of taxation dependent 
on the level of economic development. Looking at the taxation treaty between Norway and 
the Ivory Coast, some evidence of how moral legitimacy has indirectly influenced the 
outcome of taxation treaties can be found. This treaty diverges from the trend of a 10% cap of 
royalties in the source country, and sets the cap at 16%. The treaty also gives extensive 
benefits to the source country when it comes to production based on natural resources where 
there is a royalty attached. Because the Ivory Coast is a typical source country and Norway 
has not made a reservation, it is evident that this cap has been made for the benefit of the 
Ivory Coast. In addition, the Ivory Coast is the least developed country considered in the 
analysis above and the country receiving the most favourable treatment, which raise the 
question of whether this is done for moral reasons. Norway may have felt during negotiations 
that “the right thing to do” was to grant the Ivory Coast some additional beneficial treatment.  
 
The interview at the Norwegian Ministry of Finance revealed that: “We are generally more 
accommodating to taxing royalties at source in developing countries as opposed to developed 
countries. The total picture of the interactions between Norway and a developing country will 
differ from our relations with for instance Germany or the Netherlands” (Appendix 2, 2014 
[interview]). This statement supports the findings above that, at least in the case of Norway, 
morality may influence the outcome of negotiations in the sense that developing countries 
may receive special treatment due to their status as a developing country.  
 
Another case where moral legitimacy seems to matter, although a less obvious case, is the 
taxation treaty between India and Vietnam. While Vietnam prefers not to tax royalties 
exclusively in the state of residence, India has a preference for taxing only royalties from 
technical service also in the source country. However, the agreement provides taxation right 
to the source country up to 10%. Although this does not go directly against India's 
preferences, it is the views of Vietnam which are explicitly reflected in the taxation treaty. 
Although India is a much more powerful economy (as will be expanded upon below), 
Vietnam has received concessions from India so that Vietnam's preferences are the most 
visible in the taxation treaty. This may also signal moral considerations in that India refrains 
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from insisting on having their concrete preferences followed in order to provide benefits to a 
less developed country than themselves.  
 
These examples show that moral legitimacy seems to be a factor which can explain the level 
of adherence to the Model Tax Convention in certain cases. The data material does not 
provide conclusive evidence that moral legitimacy is the only factor of interests, but the cases 
referred to here, and the statement provided in the interview, demonstrates the viability of 
moral legitimacy as a possible explanation.  
 
Cognitive legitimacy is legitimacy based upon decisions taken without deliberate calculations, 
as a result of countries taking the direction of these decisions for granted. Chapter 5 analysed 
the reservation picture and found that reservations represent a sign that countries do not take 
the Model Tax Convention for granted. Rather, the reservations are a sign that countries 
deliberately evaluate the propositions of the Model Tax Convention, and if they disagree with 
the propositions therein they make reservations.  
 
When looking at the bilateral taxation treaties there seems to be some evidence in support of 
cognitive legitimacy as an explanatory factor for decisions that states make. In each case 
explored here where one country has made a reservation, this reservation has been taken into 
account and is reflected in the bilateral taxation treaty. In the vast majority of taxation treaties, 
it seems like one country accepts the reservations made by the other country. This leads most 
treaties to share taxation of royalties and cap the tax at 10% in the source country. The 
repeated appearance of a 10% cap reflects some kind of unwritten consensus that this is an 
appropriate level of taxation for royalties in the source country. Also, the repeated appearance 
of the 10% cap seems to reflect that this compromise is accepted without deliberate 
calculations, thus signalling an element of cognitive legitimacy. The employee at the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance was asked to reflect on the fact that the 10% cap on royalties 
in the source state seems to be the norm, and claimed that “The fact that countries end up with 
a 10% cap is because it is a natural compromise” (Appendix 2, 2014[interview]). Apart from 
this statement, the informant did not have any further insights into why taxation treaties set 
royalty taxation rates at 10% in the source state, which supports the impression of the 10% 
cap as a cognitive decision made by states.  
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However, it is not likely that negotiators have accepted a 10% cap on taxation of royalties in 
the source country without discussions with the opposing party. Most likely, negotiations 
have dwelled at this particular proposition in the Model Tax Convention, and the parties have 
ended up with a compromise at 10%. Due to this fact, it is not particularly satisfying to 
conclude that cognitive legitimacy is a good explanation for the level of adherence.   
 
Self-interests as a variable rests upon the assumption that states act to maximise their own 
benefits. When it comes to the bilateral taxation treaties we are looking at the result of 
communication between two states which may have different views on the benefits that the 
Model Tax Convention has for themselves. Still, despite of these differences in interests, the 
parties have come together and agreed upon a taxation treaty which they intend to enforce on 
actors operating across the two economies.   
 
There is a general trend of not adhering to the OECD principle of taxing royalties exclusively 
in the state of residence. Instead, a 10% tax on royalties in the source states is usually allowed 
in the taxation treaty. In terms of self-interests this signals that states do not expect the OECD 
proposition to be of benefit. They seem to weigh not adhering to the OECD principle higher 
than adhering for the sake of respecting the higher goals and aims of the OECD as an 
organisation. Even states which adhere to the Model Tax Convention in terms of not issuing a 
reservation put their preferences aside in order to respect the reservation of another state 
which lowers the overall level of adherence.  
 
Chapter 5 showed that the decision to make a reservation or not towards the Model Tax 
Convention is based primarily upon the expected benefits that states stand to gain from 
making a reservation or not making a reservation. However, when the process of evaluating 
the Model Tax Convention itself is completed by individual states, and state start to negotiate 
with each other over what bilateral taxation treaties should look like, this thesis finds no 
evidence that self-interests is a major part of the taxation treaties. It is likely that states will try 
to promote their own self-interests in the negotiation process. However, the actual outcome 
presented by the taxation treaties themselves provide evidence that compromise seem to be 
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the most important trait, as demonstrated by the 10% compromise observed in the majority of 
taxation treaties considered.  
 
Negotiation power is in the theoretical framework divided into three aspects, namely 
aggregate structural power, issue-specific structural power and behavioural power. However, 
issue-specific power is considered the most important aspect of negotiation strength for the 
purpose of this thesis, and will be defined in terms of GDP (measured in current US $) as 
relative economic power is considered the determining factor in negotiations over taxation 
treaties. The reason why I use GDP as a measurement is because states negotiating with each 
other will be concerned primarily with the issue of how important the economy of the 
opposing state is to themselves. If a small economic power is negotiating with a large 
economic power, then the relationship will be influenced more by this fact than, for example, 
the size of the economy relative the size of the population (GDP per capita). In order to be 
able to determine the relative economic power of each party to the negotiations, each taxation 
treaty must be considered in turn. I will do so by comparing GDP for the parties negotiating. I 
have decided to use the indicator for the year that the taxation treaty was signed only, because 
I consider it representable for the time period which was used negotiating the taxation treaty 
and it is unlikely that the relative economic power will have shifted significantly over the 
negotiation process. Note that the figures have different scales dependent on the size of the 
economies in question in each case. 
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Norway and the Nordic Countries 
Figure 6.1 indicates that the economic 
situation of the Nordic countries varies, with 
Sweden being the largest economy and 
Iceland being the absolute smallest in 1996. 
Despite the difference in the size of 
economies, the Nordic countries have the 
same preferences on policies following the 
reservations to the Model Tax Convention 
(no reservations; adhere to the OECD 
principle). Based upon the similarities in 
Figure 6.1: GDP Nordic Countries, 1996        preferences then, there is no background for 
making conclusions about the importance of economic capabilities in this case.   
 
 
Norway and Mexico 
The size of Mexico's economy was considerably 
larger than Norway's in 2001. While Norway 
prefers taxing royalties in the state of residence, 
Mexico prefers taxing at least part of the royalty 
in the source country. If economic capabilities 
were the determining factor, then we would 
expect Mexico as a bigger economy to affect the 
content of the taxation treaty. As the treaty 
opens up for shared taxation rights on royalties, 
this expectation is borne out in reality.  
Figure 6.2: GDP Norway and Mexico, 2001      
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Norway and India  
 
In 2011 there was a large difference between 
Norway's and India's economic power. Relative 
to each other, India held a considerably higher 
level of economic strength than Norway. If 
negotiation power had the power to explain 
adherence, India's preferences of taxing royalties 
exclusively in the state of residence - with an 
exception for royalties and fees for technical 
service would have been followed in the bilateral 
taxation treaty. The taxation treaty follows 
Figure 6.3: GDP Norway and India, 2011  India's preferences in this manner. Norway also 
adheres to the principle of exclusive taxation rights on royalties to the state of residence, but 
does not treat royalties and fees for technical services differently to other types of royalties. 
India's greater economic capabilities seem to contribute to its ability to achieve its preferences 
in negotiations.      
 
Norway and the Ivory Coast 
During the negotiations between Norway and the 
Ivory Coast in 1978 there was a vast disparity 
between the economic power capabilities of the 
two countries, where Norway had a much higher 
level of economic strength than the Ivory Coast. 
If negotiation power was a determining factor of 
explanation then, we would expect Norway's 
preferences to dominate the level of adherence 
to the Model Tax Convention reflected in the 
taxation treaty. This is, however, not the case. 
Figure 6.4: GDP Norway and the Ivory Coast, 1978   Norway's preference of taxing 
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royalties exclusively in the state of residence is not adhered to in the taxation treaty. Rather, 
shared taxation of royalties and exclusive taxation rights to the source state on royalties from 
natural resources is established through the taxation treaty. It can be deduced that negotiation 
power does not influence the outcome of the negotiations in this case.  
 
India and Mexico 
 
India had the highest level of economic power 
in relation to Mexico under the negotiations in 
2010. With India's adherence to the Model Tax 
Convention and its exception for royalties and 
fees for technical service, we would expect that 
the taxation treaty would follow these 
preferences if negotiation power was a variable 
with explanatory power. Mexico has made a full 
reservation against taxing royalties in the state 
of residence only, which we would not expect to 
Figure 6.5: GDP India and Mexico, 2010    be followed due to Mexico's lower economic 
capabilities. These expectations are followed up as the taxation treaty reflects only the limited 
reservation that India has made. The treaty states that only royalties and fees for technical 
service may be taxed in the source country, while other royalties are to be taxed in the country 
of residence. This is evidence that India's economic power seems to have influenced the 
outcome of negotiations.  
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India and Vietnam 
  
India had a considerably higher level of 
economic power compared to Vietnam in 1995. 
If negotiation power has explanatory power we 
would expect India which has made a limited 
reservation to the Model Tax Convention to 
determine the outcome of negotiations. 
However, the taxation treaty states that taxation 
of all royalties are to be shared between the state 
of residence and the source state, which is the 
preference of Vietnam, which has made a full 
Figure 6.6: GDP India and Vietnam, 1995 reservation to the proposition outlining this 
principle in the Model Tax Convention. Although India’s reservation is covered by the 
taxation treaty, the proposition goes further and satisfies Vietnam’s preferences. Negotiation 
power thus does not seem to have determined the outcome. 
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Vietnam and Australia 
 
Australia had a considerably higher level of 
economic power than Vietnam in 2002 when the 
negotiations were carried out. It would be 
expected that Australia's preferences of not 
taxing royalties exclusively in the state of 
residence would be reflected in the bilateral 
taxation treaty. This expectation holds true, as 
the taxation treaty establishes that taxation of 
royalties should be shared between the two 
countries. This is, however, also the preference 
Figure 6.7: GDP Vietnam and Australia, 2002     of Vietnam. It is therefore difficult to 
conclude that negotiation power has influenced the outcome of negotiations, as the two parties 
are in agreement on how to distribute taxation of royalties.  
 
From the analysis of negotiation power above, it seems that, to a certain extent, economic 
capabilities have the power to explain the level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention 
reflected in the bilateral taxation treaties. The taxation treaties between the Nordic countries, 
and Vietnam and Australia do not provide conclusive proof in either direction. The treaties 
between Norway and the Ivory Coast, and India and Vietnam seem to suggest that higher 
negotiation power does not determine the outcome of negotiations. However the taxation 
treaties between Norway and Mexico, Norway and India, and India and Mexico show 
evidence of negotiation power being a decisive factor for determining the outcome of 
negotiations, and thus also to which extent the taxation treaty adheres to the Model Tax 
Convention. The data material is thus divided. However, what should be noted is that in cases 
where preferences are the same, one would not readily expect to find conclusive evidence, as 
it would not have been necessary for disagreements to be resolved. This summary is presented 
in table 6.2. 
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Economic 
capabilities matter 
Same Preferences/ 
Inconclusive 
Economic capabilities 
does not matter 
Norway-Mexico Nordic countries Norway-Ivory Coast 
Norway-India Vietnam-Australia India-Vietnam 
India-Mexico   
Table 6.2: Summary of Analysis of Negotiation Power 
  
Table 6.2 demonstrates that the data material provides mixed evidence. However, if we 
discount the cases where full agreement over preferences were present, then the majority of 
cases indicate that economic power as an indicator of negotiation power does seem to matter 
with regards to how negotiations over taxation treaties are concluded. The state with the 
highest economic capabilities has the most power over the negotiation outcome. 
 
 Discussion of Explanations  6.7
The analysis of the independent variables shows that self-interests do not seem to adequately 
explain the outcome of bilateral taxation treaties. This is not to say that self-interests are not 
important altogether; it has been demonstrated in the previous chapter that they are, but by the 
time states start to negotiate over the content of taxation treaties, the data material used in this 
thesis cannot support self-interests to be an important factor of explanation.  
 
Cognitive legitimacy seems to explain certain aspects of the negotiations between states over 
taxation treaties. Rather than deliberate calculations over which rate of taxation of royalties is 
appropriate, it seems that states accept reservations made by other states, and furthermore 
accept a cap of taxation rates at 10% without much contemplation. Of course, it is impossible 
to say exactly what has happened around the negotiation table, but the repeated appearance of 
the 10% taxation rate indicates that states may accept this level of taxation rates cognitively. 
However, it is difficult to determine the certainty of this observation. 
 
Moral legitimacy seems to be a viable explanation to a certain extent. In the taxation treaty 
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between a very developed country and the least developed country considered in this analysis, 
morality trumps other factors as demonstrated by the taxation treaty between Norway and the 
Ivory Coast. Norway, which has the largest economy, seems to put their preferences aside in 
order to fulfil the preferences of the Ivory Coast. The analysis of the negotiation power of 
states also identified this particular taxation treaty as the only odd treaty where economic 
power did not decisively influence the outcome of negotiations. This observation adds to the 
notion that morality played a part in determining the outcome of negotiations. The taxation 
treaty between Vietnam and India is another case where India as the greatest power has given 
up their preferences in order to comply with Vietnam's wishes over the content of taxation 
treaties. The interview with the representative from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
further confirmed that states, at least in the case of Norway, differentiate treatment between 
developed countries and developing countries, where the less developed countries are more 
likely to receive favourable treatment. Thus, moral legitimacy appears to be a variable which 
explains the level of adherence in certain cases.  
 
Negotiation power seems to be a convincing explanation for the level of adherence to the 
Model Tax Convention observed in the bilateral taxation treaties. The taxation treaties 
between Norway and Mexico, Norway and India, and India and Mexico provide evidence that 
negotiation power is able to explain the outcome of negotiations. These treaties show how the 
country with the largest economy, and thus the greatest economic power, is the country whose 
preferences are adhered to in the taxation treaty. The taxation treaties between Norway and 
the Ivory Coast, and India and Vietnam are the only treaties where economic capabilities do 
not explain the outcome of negotiations. The remaining taxation treaties analysed in this 
chapter provide mixed evidence where it is uncertain whether economic capabilities play a 
role in determining the outcome, because the states involved in negotiations had the same 
preferences at the outset. 
 
Table 6.2 provides a summary of the analysis of which taxation treaties indicated negotiation 
power as an important factor for determining the outcome, and thus determining the level of 
adherence to the Model Tax Convention. Table 6.3 combines the results with the analysis of 
moral legitimacy as a viable explanatory factor for adherence.  
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Economic capabilities 
matter 
Moral considerations matter Same Preferences/Inconclusive 
Norway-Mexico Norway-Ivory Coast Norway-Nordic Countries 
Norway-India India-Vietnam Vietnam-Australia 
India-Mexico   
Table 6.3: Negotiation power versus Moral Legitimacy 
 
Table 6.3 demonstrates that the results of the analysis of which explanatory factor seems to be 
the most important for determining the level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention in 
terms of bilateral taxation treaties, is not conclusive in the sense that one variable clearly 
explain variance in adherence. Quantitatively, the size of state's economy, and thus the level 
of power in negotiations explain the result of most negotiations, but with such small margins 
it is not satisfactory to conclude that power is the best explanation. Rather, it seems like both 
explanations have some power to account for variation in adherence in different types of 
negotiations. It is likely that depending on the countries negotiating, the strength of their 
preferences and their relationship to each other, the relative power of each state and the moral 
perception of states influence the outcome of negotiations.   
 Summary 6.8
This chapter has focused on selected bilateral taxation treaties that have been concluded. 
Using the codings of reservations from the previous chapter, and the distinction between 
member countries and non-member countries of the OECD, allowed me to consider taxation 
treaties from different groups of countries. Although the selection of taxation treaties was 
strategic and selected with an intention to improve variation in the sample with regards to the 
dependent variable, it should be noted that the sample may not be representative for the entire 
population. With such a small sample bias may occur, but through transparency in the 
selection process and the strategic sample which derived from this process, I hope to have 
minimised bias to the largest possible extent. After having outlined the reasons for selecting 
which countries to consider in the analysis, the content of Article 12 was analysed in each 
bilateral taxation treaty. In general, it was discovered that the taxation treaties demonstrate a 
low level of adherence to the OECD principle of awarding exclusive taxation rights to the 
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country of residence. This has not been recognised in previous literature concerning the 
Model Tax Convention. Rather, it is often assumed that the Model Tax Convention is the 
model that countries use for taxation treaties. This is an indication that the legitimation 
strategies used by the OECD (Chapter 4), which were discovered to be mainly cognitive 
legitimation, has had the desired effect. Scholars dealing with taxation treaties and the OECD 
tend to take it for granted that the Model Tax Convention of the OECD is the primary tool for 
concluding taxation treaties, without recognising that in reality the level of adherence is not 
very high. In commemoration of the 50
th
 anniversary of the Model Tax Convention in 2008, 
the OECD hosted a conference of which Ault notes that, “Both the level of participation and 
the geographical diversity represented at the conference would seem concrete evidence of the 
perceived importance of the role of the OECD in developing international tax norms” (Ault, 
2009: 757). He bases his study upon the importance of the OECD in international tax matters. 
Similarly, Lesage and Van de Graaf have written an entire essay that aims to show how the 
OECD is thriving internationally in the issue-area of taxation. They claim that “The OECD 
has long been the linchpin of international cooperation on tax matters” (2013: 84). I will not 
argue against the claim that the OECD plays an important role in the matter of taxation in the 
international sphere, but the purpose of referring to these academic works is to show that there 
might be a lack of critical observation on the level of adherence when it comes to the OECD 
and the Model Tax Convention. In this regard, it can be concluded that OECD's cognitive 
legitimation strategy has been successful in convincing scholars of international taxation of 
the prominence of the Model Tax Convention, while states act in a different manner.   
 
Instead of adhering to the OECD principle of taxing royalties in the state of residence, shared 
taxation of royalties is the main trend in the taxation treaties considered in this chapter. In 
most cases, taxation is split between the source country and the country of residence, and a 
cap of 10% at source is the norm in the treaties considered.  
 
The analysis of the explanatory factors behind this trend found evidence of several factors 
influencing the decision to accept reservations in the bilateral taxation treaties. Self-interests 
do not seem to be a factor with any explanatory power on the level of adherence in the 
taxation treaties. In the previous chapter, it was found that self-interests account for variation 
in adherence between OECD member states and OECD non-member states. This explanation 
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for variance has already been taken into account when considering the taxation treaties 
concluded, because these treaties take the reservations into consideration during the 
negotiations. However, the taxation treaties themselves do not seem to reflect self-interests to 
be factors of importance to the outcome further than respecting the reservations. Cognitive 
considerations seem to influence the level of adherence to a certain extent. The 10% cap on 
taxation of royalties in the source state is evidence pointing towards this unofficial standard 
being taken for granted as a recognised compromise on what taxation rate to land upon when 
there is disagreement over where to tax royalties.  
 
Moral considerations are taken into account in the taxation treaty between Norway and the 
Ivory Coast, and between India and Vietnam, where respectively Norway and India foregoes 
their preferences of taxing royalties in the state of residence and, rather, grants extensive 
taxation rights to the country less developed than themselves. The interview conducted also 
confirms that, at least in the case of Norwegian taxation treaty negotiations, special 
considerations might be taken in order to provide a beneficial treaty to less developed 
countries. The explanation of adherence related to the power of each state, has also been 
demonstrated to be of importance in certain taxation treaty. In the treaties between Norway 
and Mexico, Norway and India, and India and Mexico, the state with the highest power 
capabilities have had their preferences followed. Thus, the results are mixed, but moral 
legitimacy and negotiation power are recognised as the most important factors for explaining 
adherence to the Model Tax Convention.  
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7 Compilation of Findings and 
Conclusions  
 
 
 Introduction 7.1
This thesis set out to answer two research questions. The first question asked “how has the 
OECD proceeded in legitimating the Model Tax Convention?” while the second research 
question asked “why do countries from all over the world adhere to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and its principle of exclusive right to tax royalties in states of residence?” These 
research questions emerged from a curiosity over the way the OECD Model Tax Convention 
was portrayed as the most influential model for negotiating taxation treaties in literature and 
among organisations working with taxation issues. After having outlined and developed the 
theoretical framework, the analytical model and the research design in chapters 2-3,  chapters 
4-6 analysed the two research questions using the method of pattern-matching to find 
evidence of theoretical explanations in the empirical material. While chapter 4 focused on 
answering the first research question, chapters 5 and 6 aimed to answer the second research 
question. This chapter will summarise the findings and discuss the links between the findings 
in empirical chapters. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how this thesis has answered 
the research questions. 
 
 Summary of findings 7.2
Chapter 4 used the OECD publication where the Model Tax Convention is the main content, 
to analyse the legitimation strategies used by the OECD. By looking at the introductory 
chapter to the publication which is written by the OECD itself, it was possible to detect the 
strategies used by the organisation. Due to the lack of discussion over why the Model Tax 
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Convention is the best model to construct taxation treaties from, and the focus on the Model 
Tax Convention as the obvious choice for decision-makers, it was deducted that the OECD 
has used cognitive legitimation strategies. The OECD has foregone important discussions and 
rather assumes that the Model Tax Convention is the most influential model. A particular way 
in which this is seen is through the way the OECD portrays the UN Double Taxation Model 
Convention. Rather than recognising that the UN Model was constructed due to 
dissatisfaction with the OECD Model, the OECD portrays this alternative model as a 
reproduction of the Model Tax Convention.  
 
Chapter 5 looked at the reservations made by states towards the principle of taxing royalties 
exclusively in the state of residence, as advocated in the Model Tax Convention, and analysed 
reservations in terms of the independent variables. The OECD publication provides 
information on which states have chosen to make a reservation towards aspects of the Model 
Tax Convention and therefore has an intention not to adhere to this particular proposition. It 
was found that adherence to the Model Tax Convention is lower than expected, and also that 
states which are not members of the OECD are much less likely to adhere than member-
countries of the OECD.  Furthermore, I found that adherence to the Model Tax Convention 
can be best explained by the self-interests that states have in the propositions. The countries 
which gain the most benefits from adhering to the Model Tax Convention will do so, while 
states which benefit the most from alternative policies will choose not to adhere to the Model 
Tax Convention. 
 
In order to get a more comprehensive picture of why states adhere to the Model Tax 
Convention, chapter 6 analysed a small sample of bilateral taxation treaties. This was done in 
order to further the understanding of how the Model Tax Convention is practically used and 
adhered to. The chapter found that taxation treaties are not reproductions of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention, but that they instead divert significantly from the propositions promoted 
here. Only one taxation treaty in the sample adhere to the Model Tax Convention's principle 
of exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence, while the remaining taxation treaties does 
not follow the principle but rather agree upon shared taxation rights between the state of 
residence and the source state. It was found that the most viable explanations for this trend 
were moral legitimacy and negotiation power. Although the 10% cap on tax rates on royalties 
in the source country reoccurred in many taxation treaties, the evidence was not strong 
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enough to conclude that cognitive legitimacy is the most important factor determining to 
which extent taxation treaties adhere to the Model Tax Convention. Instead the data material 
provided mixed evidence that states either respect the wishes of negotiation partners less 
developed than themselves, or that the state with the most power capabilities determine the 
outcome of negotiations. With the logic of the variables in question, one case cannot be 
evidence of both moral legitimacy and power as a factor, because they illustrate the opposite 
phenomena. While three taxation treaties illustrated negotiation power as the most important 
factor, two treaties pointed to moral legitimacy being the deciding factor.  
 
Summarised the findings of this thesis point to the OECD using cognitive strategies to 
legitimate the Model Tax Convention. Adherence to the Model Tax Convention from the 
perspective of states is caused by self-interests when it comes to the decision of making 
reservations, and a mixture of moral legitimacy and negotiation power when it comes to 
determining the outcome of negotiations between states.  
 
 Implications of Findings 7.3
The findings outlined in the previous section have so far been treated as individual analysis 
and findings. However, this section will attempt to view the findings from this thesis together 
in order to demonstrate how the research questions tie together and have been answered.  
 
The second research question asked why states adhere to the principle of exclusive taxation 
rights to the state of residence, but it might as well have asked what explains the level of 
adherence to this principle. At the outset of my work with this thesis I had an underlying 
assumption that states did in fact adhere to the principle of exclusive taxation rights to the 
state of residence particularly, and the Model Tax Convention generally. After having read 
about the Model Tax Convention and the OECD's work within international taxation issues, I 
had an assumption that this was the main model for taxation treaties, although this might not 
have been an entirely conscious assumption. When the research questions were formulated, it 
did not occur to me that states might not in fact adhere to the Model Tax Convention to the 
extent to which I assumed. This assumption strengthens the findings of chapter 4 that the 
OECD has used cognitive legitimation strategies, and is a demonstration that the strategy has 
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been successful. One of the main findings of this thesis is the realisation that the level of 
adherence, which has been formulated as the dependent variable of the research project, is in 
fact very low. Both in terms of the reservations states make towards the Model Tax 
Convention and in terms of the bilateral taxation treaties in the sample, the level of adherence 
is low. The unconscious belief that adherence would be higher which was developed before 
the analysis was executed may be a sign that the cognitive legitimation strategies of the 
OECD has been successful when it comes to the literature and the reviews of the Model Tax 
Convention in the international community concerned with international taxation. It should be 
mentioned that the literature and the general knowledge of the taxation work of the OECD 
that the author read was mainly produced by states and organisations from OECD member-
countries, as well as the OECD itself.  
 
However, the analysis of the second research question has demonstrated that the cognitive 
legitimation strategy by the OECD may not have been equally successful with regards to the 
states using the Model Tax Convention. The generally low level of adherence is a sign that 
states do not accept the Model Tax Convention as legitimate from a cognitive perspective. 
Particularly are states which are not members of the OECD sceptical towards the principle of 
exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence as advocated in the Model Tax Convention. 
It has been demonstrated that the way the OECD portrays the influence of the Model Tax 
Convention beyond OECD-membership is not in line with the findings of this research 
project, which has found evidence that non-OECD states do not accept the OECD's 
proposition. In my material, only the United Arab Emirates accept the principle of exclusive 
taxation rights to the state of residence without any reservations either full or partial.  
 
The level of adherence to the Model Tax Convention seems to be determined primarily by 
self-interests, moral legitimacy and power. States that benefit from taxing royalties in the state 
of residence will adhere to the Model Tax Convention's principle without reservations, while 
states that do not benefit explicitly from taxing royalties in this manner will issue a 
reservation towards the principle. Furthermore, the state with the highest economic 
capabilities will most often have their preferences heard in negotiations over the content of 
taxation treaties, indicating more realist theories of international relations to be of importance. 
However, this finding is not compatible with the finding that also moral legitimacy seems to 
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be of importance in deciding the outcome from negotiations. Seen together, it seems like 
states will evaluate their opposing partner to the taxation treaty and act in different manners 
depending on which state they are negotiating with.  
 
Although this has been a theory-guided study which has used theory to identify trends in the 
empirical material through the method of congruence, the findings discussed here have 
implications beyond the theoretical perspective. Finding that the OECD is using cognitive 
legitimation strategies implies that states, scholars, tax authorities and courts of law should be 
aware that the perception of the Model Tax Convention they have, might be biased in the 
sense that it could be affected by the rhetoric of the organisation. Taking note of this potential 
bias may help actors gain an improved awareness of the Model Tax Convention, its 
importance and influence. Furthermore, in negotiations over taxation treaties with other states, 
states should critically evaluate the opposing party where there is disagreement over the 
content of the taxation treaty. If the opposing states have asymmetrical power capabilities one 
should be aware whether the other party is using its power to determine the outcome, or 
addressing moral concerns. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that a low income country 
might be able to influence the negotiations to a great extent if it chooses to emphasise the 
morality of a high income country giving concessions.  
 
The introductory chapter presented one theoretical debate, and two empirical debates to which 
this thesis aimed to contribute. First, the debate on adherence to international standards, 
norms and rules is of increasing interests to the study of international relations. Finding out 
what makes states comply with standards or rules imposed on them from some outside entity 
has been debated vigorously among scholars, and the debate on environmental regimes was 
used as an illustrative example. This thesis has contributed to the debate through showing that 
states tend to comply with policies which corresponds to their own economic preferences. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that in negotiations where there is asymmetry in 
interests and power, the state with the most power capabilities seem to determine the outcome 
of negotiations. However, despite the importance of interests and power, which are often 
related to the school of realism, moral legitimacy also seems to be of interests in determining 
outcomes. The fact that states do not follow the Model Tax Convention even where the 
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propositions satisfy their interests, but rather respect the preferences of states with lower 
economic capabilities than themselves, demonstrates the importance of moral considerations.  
 
Empirically this thesis has contributed to the debate on international taxation and the role of 
institutions. By investigating the work of the OECD on the harmonisation of taxation on 
economic activity across borders, the thesis adds to existing literature by providing a thorough 
analysis of the Model Tax Convention and the taxation of royalties in particular. The focus on 
the OECD can be seen as part of a larger debate on the role of institutions in distributing 
resources internationally. Institutions as tools for distributive politics is a debate which often 
depends heavily upon the theoretical perspective from which the research is conducted. 
Realists are likely to discourage cooperation and instead promote the principle of self-help for 
each individual state. Liberalists are usually more enthusiastic about the role of institutions 
and focus on how cooperation might improve, while constructivists are often concerned with 
the norms that make cooperation emerge. However, I believe that this thesis has contributed 
to the debate on the role of institutions by investigating explanations derived from a wider 
spectrum of theoretical perspectives. By developing variables with foundation in all schools 
of thought, I have investigated institutions from a more eclectic perspective, and found that 
interests, power and morale influence how institutions are perceived.  
 
 Concluding Remarks 7.4
This chapter has provided a summary of this thesis and highlighted some implications of the 
findings. I have demonstrated how the findings have implications beyond the scope of this 
thesis and into academic debates. However, the discussions and results have opened up for 
possible further studies on the topic of the OECD Model Tax Convention and international 
taxation. 
 
This thesis has used qualitative research methods. In answering the first research question 
alternative methodological approaches would be difficult and, I believe, not as fruitful in the 
sense that the subtle language nuances analysed here could not have been analysed in depth. 
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However, an alternative approach to answering the second research question would have been 
to create quantitatively coded variables to analyse adherence to the Model Tax Convention. 
Particularly, analysis of reservations to the Model Tax Convention can be coded easily, as 
demonstrated by the codings which were done in this thesis (Appendix 1). A statistical 
analysis of reservations, not just to the article concerning the taxation of royalties but to the 
remaining articles in the Model Tax Convention, could help shed light on the perception that 
states have of the Model Tax Convention, and could be useful in developing a deeper 
understanding of which countries make reservations.  
 
A possible strengthening of the analysis of adherence to the Model Tax Convention might 
arise from a further investigation into the UN Double Taxation Model Convention. If the 
discussions in the UN result in a decision to include reservations to the Model, a comparison 
between the reservations made to the two Conventions would be a way to further investigate 
the nature of adherence to both Model Conventions.   
 
This thesis has not analysed the aspect of behavioural power in negotiations, which it should 
be noted, may significantly influence the outcome of negotiations. The outcome of 
negotiations over taxation treaties may depend heavily on the personal capacity of 
negotiators. Due to the difficulty in achieving information about the negotiation process and 
dynamics, I have not had the opportunity to include this aspect in the analysis. Now that 
negotiation power has been identified as an important factor for determining why states 
adhere to the Model Tax Convention, this aspect may be interesting to consider in further 
research by looking at how individual negotiators an negotiation tactics may further influence 
outcomes. Analysing taxation treaties with the aspect of behavioural power as a factor for 
analysis may also be useful to understand the role of moral legitimacy versus the role of 
power in negotiations.  
 
Lastly, the topic of international taxation is under-studied from the perspective of political 
science. The system of taxation was, as addressed in Chapter 4, created over a century ago, 
and the national focus of taxation may not be suitable for the multinational economy we see 
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today. Double taxation, as well as the emergence of double non-taxation should be a topic of 
study for political scientists in order to further our understanding of taxation systems and the 
interactions between these, the strategies companies use to get around these systems and 
remedies to create resilient and effective taxation legislation.    
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1:  Reservations to Article 12 
The tables presented in this appendix in the basis for tables 5.1 and 5.2. They are included in 
the appendix in order to get a full understanding of the reservations made towards Article 12, 
and how I coded these in advance of conducting the analysis. 
 
The first coded column relates to reservations made towards paragraph 1 in which the 
principle of exclusive taxation rights of income from royalties to the state of residence is 
found. This column is the most important for the study conducted in this thesis, but in order to 
get a more comprehensive picture of the reservations made towards Article 12, some other 
codings have also been conducted. The second coded column also refers to the principle of 
exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence, but deal with smaller reservations i.e. not 
reservations to the entire paragraphs but aspects of it. For example, India does not reserve 
itself from the principle of exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence in general, but 
reserve the right to tax royalties deriving from technical assistance at source. The second 
paragraph of Article 12 defines royalties according to the OECD. The third column in the 
tables below is related to this definition, and indicates which countries choose to expand upon 
the OECD definition. The last coded column is related to the OECD Commentaries and 
indicate disagreement with the commentaries related to Paragraph 1. This column is coded 
positively for those countries which do not agree with the OECD's interpretation of the 
principle of exclusive taxation rights to the state of residence.  
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OECD states
Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 Commentary
Country
1 Australia 1 0 1 0
2 Austria 0 0 0 0
3 Belgium 0 0 0 0
4 Canada 0 1 1 0
5 Chile 1 0 1 0
6 Czech Republic 0 1 1 0
7 Denmark 0 0 0 0
8 Estoina* 0 0 1 0
9 Finland 0 0 0 0
10France 0 0 0 0
11 Germany 0 1 0 0
12Greece 0 1 1 1
13Hungary 0 0 1 0
14 Iceland 0 0 0 0
15 Ireland 0 0 0 0
16 Israel* 0 0 0 0
17 Italy 0 1 1 1
18Japan 0 0 0 0
19Korea 1 0 1 1
20Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
21Mexico 1 0 1 1
22Netherlands 0 0 0 0
23New Zealand 1 0 1 0
24Norway 0 0 0 0
25Poland 1 0 1 0
26Portugal 1 0 1 1
27Slovak Republic 1 0 1 1
28Slovenia 1 0 0 0
29Spain 0 0 1 1
30Sweden 0 0 0 0
31Switzerland 0 0 0 0
32Turkey 1 0 1 0
33United Kingdom 0 0 0 0
34United States 0 0 1 0
Total 10 5 17 7
* Copied from the 2010 OECD Tax Model Convention, «Non-OECD Economies' Positions
on the OECD Model Tax Convention»-section, because it became an OECD member after 
the publishing of the 2010 version
Table A1.1: OECD member countries' reservations
Reserves the 
full right to 
tax royalties 
at source
Makes 
smalles 
reservations 
to the 
paragraph
Expands the 
definition of 
royalties
Disargee 
with aspects 
of the OECD 
commentary
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Non-OECD states
Paragraph 1 Paragraph 2 
Country
1 Albania 1 0 1 0
2 Argentina 1 0 1 1
3 Armenia 1 0 1 0
4 Belarus 1 0 1 0
5 Brazil 1 0 1 1
6 Bulgaria 1 0 1 0
7 Croatia 1 0 1 0
8 DR Congo 1 0 0 0
9 Gabon 1 0 1 0
10Hong Kong, China 1 0 0 0
11 India 0 1 1 1
12 Indonesia 1 0 1 0
13 Ivory Coast 1 0 1 0
14Kazakhstan 1 0 1 0
15Latvia 1 0 1 0
16Lithuania 1 0 1 0
17Malaysia 1 0 1 1
18Morocco 1 0 1 1
19People's Republic of China 1 0 1 1
20Philippines 1 0 1 0
21Romania 1 0 1 0
22Russia 1 0 1 0
23Serbia 1 0 1 1
24South Africa 1 0 1 0
25Thailand 1 0 1 0
26Tunisia 1 0 1 1
27Ukraine 1 0 1 0
28United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0
29Vietnam 1 0 1 1
27 1 26 9
Table A1.2: Non-OECD member countries's reservations
Reserves the full 
right to tax royalties 
at source
Makes smalles 
reservations to the 
paragraph
Expands the 
definition of 
royalties
Disargee 
with aspects 
of the OECD 
commentary
134 
 
Appendix 2:  Interview 
 
This appendix is included in this thesis to account for the interview conducted in the research-
stage of the project. The appendix only outlines the main interview conducted, and this was 
the only interview which took place under formal circumstances. The conversations held 
during the OECD Forum are considered to be sufficiently accounted for in the main text. 
 
The interview object (IO) is a source at the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. The IO is part if 
the unit of the Ministry concerned with the taxation treaties that Norway has with other states, 
and is therefore well-informed about the preferences Norway advocate in negotiations with 
other countries and the process of negotiations. The IO also has a good understanding of the 
history of Model Tax Conventions – both the Model Tax Convention of the OECD and the 
UN Model Double Taxation Convention, and the work of the two organisations. The 
interview was unstructured in the sense that the interviewer came with a list of themes and 
open-ended questions rather than a structured list of questions. The interviewer had sent some 
information about the thesis and the project in advance, and the IO was prepared and started 
with a general account of the Model Tax Convention of the OECD and its influence. The 
interviewer only asked three open-ended follow-up questions which the IO spent considerable 
time answering in detail.  
 
The project and the interviews have been reported to «Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig 
datatjeneste AS» (NSD) and has been approved. All recommendations from NSD has been 
followed, and information about the project is available through the official database at: 
http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt  
 
 
